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VIRTUAL TRADEMARKS
Candidus Doughertyt & Greg Lastowkatt
Abstract
In this article, we discuss how trademark law might apply to
virtual worlds and virtual economies. In Part I, we consider how
trademark infringement in virtual worlds resembles and differs from
trademark infringement in other media. In Part II, we look at the
various business models of contemporary virtual worlds and how
commerce takes place within them. In Part II, we consider the
circumstances where trademark infringement may occur in virtual
worlds by discussing questions of use, confusion, dilution and fair
use. In Part IV, we examine the issue of contributory trademark
infringement.
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I. TRADEMARKS IN PLAY
Avatars can, for example, purchase from "enterprising"
residents virtual NIKE shoes bearing the distinctive Swoosh
Design.
-WIPO MAGAZINE'
The defendant, who goes by Rase Kenzo in Second Life, has
a pretty good excuse: 'It's only a computer game!'
-WASHNGTONPOST.COM
2
Imagine that two people, Neo and Trinity, are sitting at a table
having lunch. Neo and Trinity are somewhat unusual in that they both
have an interest in play acting. They frequently enjoy engaging each
other in discussions about imaginary events. (One imagines some
people might actually do this kind of thing from time to time.) 3
Neo: Hey Trinity, would you like to buy an imaginary
can of Coke and an imaginary pair of Nike
sneakers from me?
Trinity: Yes, Neo, I would like those imaginary things.
Here are ten imaginary dollars.
Neo: Thank you-I have now given you an imaginary
can of Coke and an imaginary pair of Nike
sneakers.
No physical exchange occurs during this conversation. Neo and
Trinity are merely talking to each other.
The owners of the Coke and Nike trademarks would never bring
a trademark lawsuit over this conversation. The exchange took place
only in the realm of imagination and entailed no actual trade of
I. Susan D. Rector et al., Second Life - Brand Promotion and Unauthorized Trademark
Use in Virtual Worlds, WIPO MAG., Nov. 2007,
http://www.wipo.int/wipomagazine/en/pdf/2007/.
2. See Second Life Players Bring Virtual Reality to Court, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct.
29, 2007, http:// blog.washingtonpost.com/offbeat/2007/10/second lifeplayersbringvirt.html
(responding to Eros, LLC et al. v. Simon, Civ. No. 07-04447-SLT-JMA (E.D.N.Y. Oct 24,
2007)).
3. See, e.g., KATHERINE PATERSON, BRIDGE TO TERABITHIA 38-47 (1977).
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physical property or currency. Enjoining this type of conversation
under the rubric of trademark law would clearly place unreasonable
limits on freedoms of thought, speech and imagination.4
Now, let's change the hypothetical situation slightly. What if
Neo and Trinity were to use a few evocative "props"?
Neo: Trinity, that was fun, but it was missing
something. Okay, so now my iced tea is going to
be a Coke, and this matchbook is a pair of Nike
sneakers. Would you like to buy another Coke
and pair of Nike sneakers from me?
Trinity: Sure! My fork is a ten dollar bill! Will you
accept it as payment?
Neo: Gladly. Enjoy your purchases!
[They trade the props.]
Here, we step cautiously outside the realm of pure speech. But,
should our analysis of this act, from the perspective of trademark law,
change just because there is an exchange of tangible material? Surely,
our natural reaction is that little here is different. Trademark law
accords with this common sense reaction.
Notably, in this case, Neo and Trinity do not own all of the
property they purport to exchange. Title to the fork (playing the part
of the money) belongs to the restaurant. Trinity and Neo presently
have a license to use the fork, but Neo will need to leave it on the
table after the play is done. If Trinity drinks the iced tea (the Coke),
either she or Neo will need to pay for it before leaving. Presumably,
Trinity can keep the matchbook. 5
From the perspective of trademark law, the legal ownership of
the chattels in play here is not a principal concern. Instead, the most
important considerations are that Neo and Trinity are not confused
about the source or origin of the items on the table and that they do
not exchange those items "in commerce." These are the fundamental
requirements of trademark infringement, and they are not met here.
4. Cf White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.6 (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that trademark law has inherent limits in a "free
society").
5. We are curious, from a legal perspective, as to the exact mechanism by which one
acquires title to matchbooks in restaurants, but such matters are beyond the scope of this
discussion.
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Apart from the spoken words, there is also no invocation of the
marks that is visible to the public or that could be associated with the
exchange of the objects. In their minds, Neo and Trinity have
fantasized about a purchase of Coca-Cola beverages and Nike
sneakers and have not shared their fantasy with others.
What if they did?
A. Trademarks in Expressive Works
FADE IN. A comer drugstore in Camden, New Jersey,
specializing in sneakers and flavored beverages. Neo stands
at the counter, playing a hand-held video game. Trinity
slams a pair of Nike sneakers and a can of Coca-Cola down
on the counter.
Trinity: Hey, you there, can I pay for these or what?
Neo: Can you give me a sec? I am on the Burly Brawl
level. Okay, okay, whatever, that'll be ten
dollars.
Trinity places a ten dollar bill on the counter and exits.
FADE OUT.
Neo and Trinity have taken their activities one step further by
financing and filming a major motion picture. Though the Coke, the
Nike sneakers and the ten dollar bill were all inauthentic articles,6
they appeared on the screen to audiences across the country as being
indistinguishable from the real things. Should Trinity and Neo be
concerned about their use of famous trademarks?
Applying common sense, infringement may seem just as
unwarranted as in the situations described above. If Neo and Trinity
cannot use and display well-known brand names in their motion
picture, should a novelist then procure a license in order to have a
character ask for a Coke?7
Motion pictures are expressive media and, like speech, are
protected against government interference by the First Amendment.
However, most major motion pictures are produced as commercial,
6. The reproduction of a ten dollar bill might give rise to criminal liabilities, but the
consideration of these laws is beyond the scope of our discussion here. See Julie K. Stapel, Note,
Money Talks: The First Amendment Implications of Counterfeiting Law, 71 IND. L.J. 153, 154-
73 (1995); J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 889, 899-904 (1993).
7. Cf Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1672 n. 11 (2007) (listing lawsuits concerning the use of
trademarks in expressive works).
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profit-driven activities. Because the sale of expressive work is a
commercial activity, it can fall within the reach of trademark law. 8
The increasing practice of paid product placement in movies
may give rise to audience confusion about sponsorship.
9
Entertainment industry decisions about the placement of brand-name
products in films and television may hinge on little more than
commercial payments. 10 If consumers are aware of this when they see
the film of Neo and Trinity, they may ask themselves: did Nike and
Coke pay to place their products in this film?
Trademark holders have frequently initiated lawsuits over the
appearance of their brands in films. As Judge Alex Kozinski has
noted, this has often occurred in instances where trademark owners
have been offended by unflattering portrayals of their marks.1" What
is surprising is that courts, on some occasions, have agreed with
plaintiffs and found defendants liable for violations of trademark
law.' 2  For instance, in the famous case of Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, a pornographic film that utilized
the costumes of the Dallas Cowboy cheerleaders was held to infringe
trademark rights.' 3 In another case, trademark infringement was found
in a parody advertisement that associated the brand of Anheuser-
Busch with "oily" beer.
14
Perhaps these cases have gone too far. Legal scholars have
argued that trademark law should not be used to limit the freedom of
8. See, e.g., Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the "use in commerce" requirement in the context of expressive
works).
9. See, e.g., id; Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 83, 87 (2006) (describing the trend toward paid placement practices in entertainment).
10. See Goodman, supra note 9, at 104.
11. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 n.6 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ("[Il]t's unlikely Kool-Aid relished being connected with LSD,
Hershey with homicidal maniacs, Disney with armed robbers, or Coca-Cola with cultural
imperialism.").
12. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting a First Amendment defense to infringement based on trademark-
protected costumes in a pornographic movie); Coca Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 1183, 1188-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that a depiction of the Coca-Cola mark in a
poster endorsing drug use infringed plaintiff's trademark rights); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774-77 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the depiction of a brewer's
mark in a parody advertisement for "oily" beer infringed brewer's trademark).
13. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206-07 (affirming the preliminary
injunction issued by the district court).
14. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d at 779 (reinstating plaintiff's trademark infringement
and dilution claims).
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creative expression,15 and some have even stated that current law,
despite these cases, should not be understood to extend to the use of
marks in expressive media. 16 Nevertheless, these adverse decisions
may make filmmakers concerned about the potential negative
consequences of allowing well-known trademarks to appear in their
films. Popular trademarks can be concealed by using more generic
props; but, risk-avoidance practices may further contribute to the
industry impression that trademark licensing is necessary for a brand
to appear in an expressive work.
1 7
Even if the general consensus of scholars is right and those
decisions that limit trademark usage in expressive works are
aberrational, it must be acknowledged that the law in this area is in
flux. The steady statutory and judicial broadening of trademark rights
in past decades (most recently by the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act 8) raise the possibility that what trademark law did not prohibit in
the past may be prohibited today or tomorrow.
So while we might hope that trademark law would not prevent
Neo and Trinity from filming and marketing their imagined scene,
they may want to be more cautious. Are we any more or less cautious
when we leave the darkened theater and enter the Matrix?
B. Trademarks in Video Games & Virtual Worlds
Neo is sitting on a sofa while, on the TV screen in front of
him, he controls a cartoonish figure in a video game. Neo (or
15. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 933-34 (2007); Goodman, supra note 9, at 106.; Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting
Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005); Brian
Goldman, Putting Lamborghini Doors on the Escalade: A Legal Analysis of the Unauthorized
Use of Brand Names in Rap/Hip-Hop, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 19 (2007); Matthew
Savare, Comment, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine: The Business, Legal,
and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, II UCLA ENT. L. REV. 331 (2004); Lauren
P. Smith, Note, Trademarks and the Movies. "An Af- fair Use' to Remember", 48 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 415, 438 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Gulasekaram, supra note, 15 at 889 ("The crux of this Article is that even
without permission, those engaged in noncommercial expression, such as filmmakers, are at
liberty to reference, disparage, ridicule, or otherwise use a trademark or trademarked product in
their expressive work without undue fear of trademark liability.").
17. Gibson, supra note 15, at 919 ("[Tjoday's audiences have learned to view branded
products in movies and television programs as more than mere incidental props, and they are
more likely to assume that prominently featured brands are licensed by the mark owner. Thus
doctrinal feedback is born.").
18. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)).
VIRTUAL TRADEMARKS
actually, the cartoon he controls) drives a Camaro Z28 down
a street that calls to mind Los Angeles, California.
He stops the car in front of a building called "The Pig Pen."
He gets out. Inside, sitting on the bar, are a pair of Nike
sneakers (recognizable by the distinctive swoosh) and a red
and white can with the words "Coca-Cola" plainly visible on
its exterior. Neo picks them up and leaves the building.
In this example, we see Neo playing a video game. We are now
very close to what will be our concern in this article. There is, today,
a specific class of video games that are referred to as virtual worlds.' 9
Although virtual worlds are arguably something more than games,
their ancestry in video game technology, culture and business
practices cannot be disputed.
Trademarks and video games have a long history. Ever since
Pong and Pac-Man burst onto scene in the 1970's and 1980's, video
game brands have been commercially important. There have been
many lawsuits during the past decades that have raised trademark
(and trademark-type) claims relating to video games. As John
Festinger noted in his recent book on video game law, trademark
rights are essential to the video game industry.2°
Generally, trademark law in the videogame industry has been
applied when the symbols were used in the promotion and sale of
video games. However, in recent years, trademark owners have
started to pay closer attention to the symbols presented within games.
They have even started to bring lawsuits when they have felt their
marks were expressively misappropriated.
For instance, in 2006, Rockstar Games, the maker of the popular
and controversial Grand Theft Auto series of games, was sued by Play
Pen Gentlemen's Club (a strip club) under a theory of trademark
infringement. 2 1 Included within Rockstar's video game GTA: San
,22Andreas was a depiction of a strip club called "The Pig Pen." The
Pig Pen was loosely based on photographs of the Play Pen.23 The
19. Often, law review articles touching on virtual worlds engage in a lengthy exposition
about the nature and history of these online environments. See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka &
Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REv. I (2004). We will presume the
reader has a basic familiarity with the term.
20. JOHN FESTINGER, VIDEO GAME LAW 65 (2005).
21. E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014 (C.D.
Cal. 2006).
22. Id. at 1017-18.
23. Id. at 1018.
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plaintiff claimed that the video game company had no right to
reproduce its mark within the video game without permission.2 4
Play Pen lost its case on Rockstar's motion for summary
judgment.25 The district court, looking to the history of trademarks
used in expressive media, ultimately found that the depiction of the
"Pig Pen" within the game was speech protected under the First
Amendment.26 The court's lengthy and somewhat convoluted opinion
indicated that it took the asserted claims quite seriously. It had to
struggle with the fabric of existing doctrine regarding fair use and free
speech rights before arriving at its conclusion.
Increasingly, it would seem the incentives of video game
manufacturers are aligned with those of film makers. Video game
makers are probably unlikely to include known trademarks within
their games due to fears of inviting lawsuits. At the same time, game
manufacturers will pursue paid placement deals to profit from
advertising.
Thus, trademark issues with respect to video games today are
probably fairly close to those found in film. One important difference
is that video games are played, not simply watched. When a player
navigates through a video game, he or she performs the game in a
manner that can constitute a form of independent expression. In the
past, this performance was largely solitary and had little impact on
others. This is changing.
In today's virtual worlds, players express themselves in ways
that may be seen by a handful, a large group or even thousands of
other players. If such players in virtual worlds are invoking
trademarks during their performances, are there trademark law
implications? Common sense might lead us to think we are simply
returning to the realm of fantasy, which falls outside the reach of
trademark law. But, common sense may lead us astray because, as
many have observed in recent years, virtual economies can be quite
real. 27
24. Id. at 1014.
25. Id. at 1049.
26. Id. at 1048.
27. See, e.g., Jason A. Archinaco, Virtual Worlds, Real Damages: The Odd Case of
American Hero, the Greatest Horse that May Have Lived, 11 GAMING L. REv. 21, 22-27 (2007);
Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90
VA. L. REv. 2043, 2059-60 (2004); Brian T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing
Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 53-61 (2007); Bettina M. Chin, Regulating Your Second
Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 1303, 1313, 1325, 1331, 1341 (2007);
Joshua Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U.L. REv. 1047, 1085 (2005); Eric Goldman, Speech
Showdowns At The Virtual Corral, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 845, 849
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As we will discuss in the next part, most virtual worlds contain
active in-game markets for various forms of virtual property. These
markets are structured around the exchange of virtual currencies.
Though these currencies are usually intended as "play money," to the
extent that they are capable of alienation (technologically), they are
almost inevitably exchanged for real cash. Even though such
exchanges are contractually forbidden by many virtual world owners,
small and large businesses have been built around the exchange of
virtual property and currencies for real money.28
If it turns out that Neo and Trinity can make real money while
engaging in fantasy commerce with their chosen brands, then perhaps
their imaginary commerce is not fantastic at all. And maybe there are
real issues that must be addressed by real unfair competition law.
II. VIRTUALLY REAL COMMERCE
Since trademark law is essentially a form of commercial
regulation, it is important to understand the variety of business
models and economies found in virtual worlds. Yet, saying anything
general about the fantastic and real commerce that occurs in virtual
worlds can be difficult because virtual commerce takes many
different forms.
By definition, virtual worlds are malleable software structures
designed to appeal to a variety of audiences. As a result, social
expectations about commerce and commercial practices vary widely.
For example, in a heavily-branded, child-oriented virtual world like
Nickelodeon's Nicktropolis,29 social activities, expectations and
virtual objects differ radically from those in a space-based, adult
wargame like Eve Online.30
Even within particular virtual worlds, it is not uncommon to find
groups of players with divergent opinions about the nature of the
space and what constitutes acceptable or desirable behavior within
(2005); Leandra Lederman, "Stranger Than Fiction": Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1620, 1629, 1655 (2007); Erez Reuveni, Authorship in the Age of the Conducer, 54 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 285, 303-04 (2007); Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds-Real Courts,
52 VILL. L. REv. 187, 229 (2007).
28. See generally JULIAN DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY (2006) (describing a year of working in
the virtual economy).
29. Nicktropolis, http://www.nick.com/nicktropolis/game/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (part
of the Nickelodeon Website).
30. EVE Online, http://www.eve-online.com/ (last visited Feb. 3. 2008).
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it.31 Often, the culture and software of a particular virtual world are
moving targets. Players establish new practices, and virtual world
owners frequently expand and improve their platforms by releasing
downloadable "patches" that modify the world's space, rules and
physics.
Bearing that in mind, we posit that there are three general types
of virtual worlds. These types are not inevitable and other categories,
subcategories and distinctions could be drawn. We offer these three
types simply to provide the reader with a sense of the varied
commercial landscape of virtual worlds.
Our first category is composed of virtual worlds structured as
games and funded by player subscription revenues. Our second
category includes virtual worlds structured as social spaces and
funded by either advertising or by sales of virtual property. Our third
category covers user-generated "metaversal ' '32 virtual worlds that are
funded through the sale and control of virtual property and harnessing
the creativity labor of distributed individuals. The dominant world in
this last category is Linden Lab's Second Life.3
A. The Game Worlds
The first and most lucrative type of virtual world today is the
game world, which can be traced back to the original structure of text-
based virtual worlds known as MUDs.34 These virtual worlds are
environments where games are played. Players explore the virtual
spaces while working together in a long and potentially unending
process of combat and social problem-solving in order to increase the
35power and wealth of their avatars. As in all games, players pursue
31. Julian Dibbell, Griefer Madness, WIRED, Feb. 2008, at 90. Julian Dibbell has recently
written about "griefer culture" in contemporary virtual worlds. As Dibbell describes, those who
"grief' virtual worlds are generally more interested in outraging other participants than they are
in playing the game by the accepted rules.
32. See NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH (1992). The term "metaverse" was first used
by Neal Stephenson in his 1992 novel, Snow Crash, but is often used to refer to immersive
three-dimensional virtual spaces like user-generated worlds. Second Life is supposedly modeled
after the Metaverse, as described in Stephenson's novel. Kevin Maney, The King of Alter Egos
is Surprisingly Humble Guy, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 5, 2007, at I B (describing an interview with
Philip Rosedale, the creator of Second Life).
33. See Second Life, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
34. "MUD" stands for "multi-user dungeon." For some background on the history of
MUDs and their evolution to contemporary virtual worlds, see Lastowka & Hunter, supra note
19. For greater detail, see also RICHARD A. BARTLE, DESIGNING VIRTUAL WORLDS 2-3 (2004).
35. An avatar is an image or icon that represents a person on the Intemet. Wikipedia,
Avatar (Computing), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avatar_%28computing%29 (as of Apr. 18,
2008, 19:11 GMT). In the context of virtual worlds, an avatar is a three-dimensional graphical
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certain game objectives (i.e. finishing quests, defeating monsters and
acquiring treasure). The typical virtual world game is, in essence, a
mix of fantasy and a Horatio Alger story 36 where players begin as
weak and powerless, but, through long hours of pluck and luck,
eventually they become the virtual lords of the online realm.
Virtual game worlds include titles such as City of Heroes,37 Dark
Age of Camelot,38 Everquest39 and Everquest 11,40 Eve Online,41
42434Lineage , Lord of the Rings Online,43 Maple Story4  and World of
Warcraft.5 These games are financed through software purchases and
monthly subscription fees. The game software usually costs from 30
to 50 dollars,46 and the monthly subscription fees range from 10 to 20
dollars.47  The world of Azeroth (the world from Blizzard
Entertainment's World of Warcrafi) is the most popular game world
in existence today. 48 Its owners claim to be generating over $1 billion
in revenue a year and providing service to over 10 million paying
subscribers.49
rendering. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 10-12 (2000). In chat
rooms, an avatar is a two-dimensional icon. KEVIN BLACKWOOD, CASINO GAMBLING FOR
DUMMIES (2006). In MUDs, an avatar is a text-based handle (or name) assigned to the player.
TIM JORDAN, CYBERPOWER: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF CYBERSPACE AND THE INTERNET
60-61 (1999).
36. Alger is a nineteenth-century best-selling author who wrote a number of "strive and
succeed" or "rags to riches" novels where young "street" boys achieved the so-called American
dream of wealth and success through working hard to overcome poverty and adversity. See
Stefan Kanfer, Horatio Alger: The Moral of the Story, CITY J., Autumn 2000, http://www.city-
joumal.org/html/10 4 urbanities-the moral.html; C.D. Merriman, Horatio Alger,
http://www.online-literature.com/horatio-alger/ (a biography of Horatio Alger).
37. City of Heroes Community Site, http://www.cityotheroes.com/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2008).
38. Dark Age of Camelot, http://www.darkageofcamelot.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
39. EverQuest, http://everquest.station.sony.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
40. EverQuest II, http://everquest2.station.sony.com/ (last visited Feb 3, 2008).
41. EVE Online, http://www.eve-online.com/ (last visited Feb. 3. 2008).
42. Lineage, http://lineage.plaync.co.kr/ (last visited Feb. 3. 2008).
43. The Lord of the Rings, http://www.lotro.com/ (last visited Feb 3, 2008).
44. MapleStory, http://www.maplestory.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
45. World of Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/index.xml (last visited Feb. 3,
2008).
46. See Blizzard Online Store, http://shop.blizzard.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
47. See World of Warcraft ("WOW') Subscribe,
http://www.worldofwconline.com/content/worldofwarcraft-subscribe.php (last visited Apr. 2,
2008).
48. See MMOGCHART.COM, http://www.mmogchart.com/Chartl.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2008) (charting the subscription growth of various virtual worlds).
49. See Press Release, Blizzard Entm't, World of Warcraft® Reaches New Milestone: 10
Million Subscribers (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.blizzard.com/press/080122.shtml; Seth
Schiesel, An Online Game, Made in U.S., Seizes the Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at Al;
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Game worlds like World of Warcrafi are similar to video games
in that the players) lack significant creative control over the
environment. Though World of Warcraft offers a considerable variety
of flora, fauna, objects and architecture, these elements are almost
invariably produced by paid employees of the company and are most
likely screened by company lawyers for compliance with the relevant
intellectual property laws.
Since most of the visual content in World of Warcraft is the
product of the game company, and not the players, recognizable
trademarks are likely to appear only when there has been a
promotional agreement between the virtual world owner and an
advertiser. While few such agreements have resulted in in-game
advertising (after all, a Nike poster or a Coca-Cola machine would
seem rather out of place in a game about orcs and elves), they have
led to cross-branding initiatives outside of the game world.50 In
China, for instance, game animation from World of Warcraft was
used in commercials to promote sales of Coca-Cola (and vice versa). 51
In the United States, a recent television commercial featured a
Warcraft warrior leading defeating a giant dragon - with the
assistance of a Toyota Tacoma truck.5
Because of the virtual world owner's high level of creative
control, the trademark law questions raised by game worlds are fairly
limited and resemble the problems posed by product placement in
motion pictures. It is important to note, though, that the limits on
player authorship powers in game worlds are probably not imposed
due to fears of incurring trademark liability for player infringement
but instead due to a desire to keep the world artistically consistent and
appealing. Greater player freedom to shape the game environment
would also significantly change the underlying dynamics of the game
itself.
Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html.
50. At least one company, Massive Incorporated, specializes in coordinating in-game
advertising campaigns. See Massive Incorporated, http://www.massiveincorporated.com/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008).
51. Seth Schiesel, An Online Game, Made in US., Seizes the Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2006, at Al.
52. Mike Musgrove, Toyota Ad Shows How Game Is Changing, WASH. POST, Oct. 10,
2007, at DI.
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All games, online and offline, have rules;. 3 Game rules place
limits on how the goals of the game may be achieved. Many times,
the most efficient or ingenious way to achieve a goal is not the
method permitted by the rules. For example, a runner in a race may
not take a shortcut through the middle of a track or utilize a bike to
reach a finish line more quickly.54 Either of these options would be
more efficient and intelligent, but both would violate the game rules
and constitute cheating.
Virtual world owners who wish to engage millions of players
may be concerned that if they were to give their players rich authorial
abilities within the game, such as the ability to create new virtual
objects, players would use these abilities to grant themselves
competitive advantages over other players. If a player could simply
create and upload a formidable avatar with great wealth and power,
there would be little incentive for players to spend long hours playing
the game (and paying subscription fees) in order to achieve the same
status.
Attempts to enforce game rules are not, however, always
successful. Indeed, when virtual world companies actively enforce
rules, this makes certain forms, of virtual property increasingly
inaccessible to all but the most dedicated players.5 5 Increased scarcity,
in turn, often gives rise to "black market" economies within games
where real money might be traded between players who are willing to
buy or sell rare virtual items. 6
In offline games, the act of paying another player to gain a
competitive advantage is frowned upon as cheating. Many, if not all,
virtual game worlds have similar prohibitions in official rules. Yet
these rules are not always respected. As Edward Castronova, Mia
Consalvo, Julian Dibbell and many others have described, real world
businesses that sell players the "service" of acquiring virtual property
for real cash have emerged - despite the prohibitions in the
contractual terms of game worlds.5 7 Recently, the makers of World of
53. JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 46
(Beacon Press 1950) (1938) (noting how games proceed within "boundaries of time and space
according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner").
54. BERNARD SUITS, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1978).
55. See Jamais Cascio, Globalization in the Virtual World, WORLD CHANGING, Jul. 9,
2005, http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/00308 1 .html.
56. See EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS 163-166 (2005); MIA CONSALVO,
CHEATING: GAINING ADVANTAGE IN VIDEOGAMES 149-172 (2007); DIBBELL, supra note 28.
57. See CASTRONOVA, supra note 56; CONSALVO, supra note 56; DIBBELL, supra note
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Warcraft brought a lawsuit against businesses that offer such services,
claiming that these businesses have promoted cheating.58
While these intersections between virtual and real economies
raise some fascinating legal questions, these are not generally
questions of trademark law.59 However, trademark problems have
arisen in game worlds in cases where owners have loosened player
authorial limitations.
For example, the South Korean company NCsoft, which makes
the City of Heroes virtual world, has provided its players with
development tools that allow them to design superhero costumes for
their avatars. 60 This is a cosmetic aspect of the game. The costume
design has no significant effect on an avatar's performance.
Nonetheless, many players devote substantial time and effort in
designing the appearance of their avatars. l
In 2005, Marvel Enterprises sued NCSoft for copyright and
trademark infringement, alleging that NCSoft provided software that
enabled its players to infringe Marvel's trademarks and copyrights in
well-known superhero characters such as Spiderman, The Hulk,
62Wolverine and Captain America. In a way, the trademark suit
closely resembled the Play Pen case but with the interesting twist that
NCSoft had not, itself, included the marks in the game environment
but instead had supplied the tools that the players used to add the
marks to the game world.6 3
58. See, e.g., Blizzard Entm't, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, L.L.C., No. 07-0589 (C.D. Cal.
2007); MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't., Inc., No. 06-2555 (D. Ariz. 2006). See also
Hemandez v. Internet Gaming Entm't., Ltd., No. 07-21403-Civ-COHN/SNOW (M.D. Fla.
2007) (class action lawsuit brought by players of World of Warcraft).
59. Those who engage in "gold farming" do not misrepresent the source of their services
or borrow the brands of others. See David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource it to Chinese, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at AI (describing "gold farming"). While gold farming may be illegal, it is
not a matter of trademark law.
60. Press Release, NCsof, NCsoft Launches City of Heroes in North America, (Apr. 28,
2004),
http://www.ncsoft.net/global/board/view.aspx?BID=mc-press&BC=&SYear-&SType=&SWor
d=costumes&PNo = l &BNo=23.
61. The value of superhero costume design is also indicated by the fact that players must
"earn" the ability to wear a cape. See City of Heroes, Cape Mission,
http://www.cityofheroesonline.com/funthings/missions/costumemissions/capesmission.php
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
62. Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft, Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
63. Both the authors helped to prepare an amicus pleading in this case, on behalf of the
game studies scholars, in support of NCSoft. To obtain a copy of the brief as well as other
documents from the case, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/cases/marvel-
v-ncsoft (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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The case was ultimately settled out of court. Before that
occurred, Marvel's trademark claims were rejected on the basis that
the use of Marvel superhero names by players within the game was
not an infringing use. 64 The court'stated that the players had not used
the marks in commerce, as required for trademark infringement:
"[P]laintiffs do not allege that game users in any way used these
character names in commerce. Rather then labeling or referencing
goods or services in the course of interstate commerce, game users
used these names to identify characters used in a recreational game. ' 65
Thus, the claim in the Marvel case failed primarily because the
court understood that the virtual environment in which the marks
were used was a non-commercial, game-focused platform. (As we
will see in the next pages, other virtual worlds have different models.)
Unfortunately, despite the fact that NCSoft prevailed, the ultimate
lesson of the Marvel suit may be that makers of future game worlds,
seeking to avoid litigation, should err on the side of caution when
deciding whether to empower participants with tools of creative
expression.
B. The Social Worlds
The second major genre of virtual world is the social world. The
dominant activity in these worlds is chat and informal play. Social
worlds are based on revenue models that entail substantial advertising
and/or the sale of virtual property to participants. In this category, we
include virtual worlds like Habbo Hotel,66 IMVU,
6 7 Club Penguin,6 8
The Sims Online,69 There,7 ° Cyworld,7 MTV's crop of several virtual
worlds72 (including The Virtual Hills73 and The Virtual Real World74),
Gaia Online 5 and Coca-Cola's CCMetro.6
64. Marvel, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303.
65. Id. at 1309.
66. Habbo, http://www.habbo.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
67. IMVU, http://www.imvu.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
68. Club Penguin, http://www.clubpenguin.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
69. The Sims Online, http://www.ea.com/official/thesims/thesimsonline/us/nai/index.jsp
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
70. There, http://www.there.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
71. Cyworld, http://us.cyworld.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
72. Virtual MTV, http://www.vmtv.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
73. The Virtual Hills, http://www.vmtv.com/virtualhills.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
74. The Virtual Real World, http://www.vmtv.com/virtualrealworld.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2008).
75. Gaia, http://www.gaiaonline.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
76. MyCoke, http://myeoke.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
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We distinguish - social worlds from game worlds based on
whether socializing (for its own sake) or game achievement (for its
own sake) is the primary animating theme of the environment. In
other words, in game worlds, players socialize during the course of
game play, whereas, in social worlds, participants play various games
in the course of socializing.
This may seem like a slim distinction, and it is. Game worlds and
social worlds overlap significantly in many ways. Game worlds are
invariably social realms where chat is an activity as common as game
play,77 and, in most social worlds, game play is a prominent
component - even when the social world's software does not include
games. Yet the game/social distinction, while thin, seems a tenable
one based on the existing landscape of virtual worlds.
Social worlds, like game worlds, have some roots in text-based
virtual worlds, but they have also been heavily influenced by the
history of visually-enhanced, "avatar chat" rooms. Social virtual
worlds tap into the popularity of chat rooms and instant messaging
systems by offering a visually richer, more complex and avatar-
mediated environment for chatting and socializing with others.
Remaining true to their roots in avatar chat, many social worlds are
free and accessible through web-based software, so participants do
not even need to leave the comfort of their web browser. 7
Habbo Hotel is one of the leading social virtual worlds. It
reportedly has an active user base of over 7 million regular monthly
participants worldwide. (mostly teenagers in the 12-16 age range).79
While registering for Habbo is free, the company sells "Habbo coins"
(at a rate of $50 for 300 coins) that can be used to purchase furniture
and clothing for avatars. 80 Reportedly, the company has generated
77. For an excellent discussion of how people socialize in and around the Everquest game
world, see T.L. TAYLOR, PLAY BETWEEN WORLDS (2006) (providing an ethnography of player
culture in Everquest).
78. Chat rooms and instant messaging systems are some of the most popular forms of
software on the Intemet-especially for younger demographics. Consumers have come to
expect that chat services, like email, will be provided as a free service, and that, due to their
low-cost, will include less impressive sound and graphics than those typically found in
commercial software like video games.
79. Marc Graser, Habbo Hotel has Hollywood hopes, VARIETY, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://www.variety.conarticle/ VRI 117971399.html?categoryid= 1009&cs= 1 &nid=2567.
80. Habbo, Coins, http://www.habbo.com/credits (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). Interestingly,
the virtual world owner threatens "permanent banning" for purchasing Habbo coins without first
asking a parent for permission.
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over $50 million through such sales of virtual objects.1 Since Habbo
is not strictly a game, spending money on virtual objects is not
viewed by other participants as a form of cheating.
The social world There, a self-described "online hangout,"
operates in a similar fashion in that users can buy in-world currency,
"Therebucks," which they may use to purchase virtual objects like
avatar fashions and home furnishings. 82 (Therebucks are also not
exchangeable for real currency.)
There allows its users to generate their own objects and to sell
them in the virtual world environment. But, like in most social
worlds, the user-generated content allowed in There is limited and
regulated. In There, user-generated content must be submitted to the
virtual world owner for approval and must comply with very specific
guidelines. Some of the There content prohibitions include: "sexually
offensive or overly suggestive material"; depictions of nudity;
"personal attacks"; "references to illegal narcotics"; gory imagery; or
the use of brand names.83
Neither the tight content restrictions nor the lack of potential real
profits have discouraged users from building There virtual businesses
and marketing virtual products under their own amateur brands.84
Makena Technologies, the owner of There, even offers its participants
advice on how to effectively market virtual products within the There
environment.85
Just as in film and video games, paid placement advertising is a
significant business in social virtual worlds. For instance, in the case
of Sims Online, both McDonald's and Intel reportedly paid millions
of dollars to place their brands in the virtual world environment.86
According to some marketing consultants, brand placement in social
81. L.A. Lorek, Game Developers Storm into Austin, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Sept. 7, 2007, at 6C.
82. There, http://www.there.com/help.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
83. There: Submission Guidelines,
http://www.there.com/developerSubmissionGuidelines.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
84. See Betsy Book, Virtual World Business Brands: Entrepreneurship and Identity in
Massively Multiplayer Online Gambling Environments (June 2005), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=736823.
85. There, Your Brand in There, http://www.there.com/yourBrand.html (last visited Feb
11,2008).
86. Ellen Edwards, Plug (the Product) and Play: Advertisers Use Online Games to Entice
Customers, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2003, at A1; Matt Richtel, Big Mac Is Virtual, But Critics Are
Real, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at G8.
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worlds allows mark owners to forge a unique and special bond
between their brands and consumers.87
Because the focus of social worlds is on socializing rather than
on game or role playing, brands may become more important socially.
Users tend to design their avatars in their own personal image - or at
least how they wish themselves to be perceived, socially, by others.88
Participants weave brands or brand names into their avatar persona
when creating their online identities. This brand incorporation
projects an "image" based on the brand's association with consumers
to other virtual world participants, which can succinctly communicate
status or culture. For example, in There, users can purchase Nike-
branded clothing and apparel for their avatars. 89 According to virtual
marketing researcher Betsy Book, users are willing to pay more -
even in virtual life - for apparel possessing the Nike swoosh to
garner the status associated with the famous mark.90
Some social worlds, like Coca-Cola's CCMetro9l and
Nickelodeon's Nicktropolis,92 take branding one step further by
devoting their social environments entirely to their respective brands.
CCMetro and Nicktroplis are marketed to children and offer "free"
access to their heavily-branded, online environments. 93 Somewhat
like virtual Disneyworlds (of which there literally are a few 94), these
environments function simultaneously both as play spaces and
advertising platforms.
87. See Betsy Book, "These bodies are FREE, so get one NOW!": Advertising &
Branding in Social Virtual Worlds (Apr. 2004),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=536422.
88. Id.
89. Leslie Walker, Will Women Go There?, WASH. POST., Jan. 12, 2003, at H7.
90. See Book, supra note 87.
91. MyCoke, http://mycoke.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
92. Nicktropolis, http://www.nick.com/nicktropolis/game/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
93. See MyCoke,CCMetro, http://www.mycoke.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008);
Nicktropolis, http://www.nick.com/nicktropolis/ game/(last visited Feb. 3, 2008). See also
Posting of Sara Grimes to Gamine Expedition, Virtual Worlds for Kids Continue to Gain
Momentum, http://gamineexpedition.blogspot.com/2007/12/virtual-worlds-for-kids-continue-
to.html (Jan. 2, 2008); Brooks Barnes, Web Playgrounds of the Very Young, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 12/31/business/31virtual.html ("Forget Second Life.
The real virtual world gold rush centers on the grammar-school set."). These worlds raise
important questions about the pervasiveness of advertising within childhood play. They provide
a much deeper and more technologically mediated relationship between children and marketers
than society has ever known in the past.
94. Disney owns at least three major child-oriented virtual worlds: Virtual Magic
Kingdom (http://vmk.disney.go.com), Toontown (http://play.toontown.com) and the recently
acquired, Club Penguin (http://www.clubpenguin.com/).
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Since social worlds are so heavily inundated by marketing and
advertising concerns, they actually tend to pose less interesting
questions from the standpoint of trademark law. While Habbo Hotel
and There depend, marginally, on the creativity of their participants
for their virtual economies, social world owners will generally tend to
prioritize the interests of brand owners by immersing their
participants in brand-saturated and carefully scripted environments.
Like players in game worlds, participants in social worlds are
unable to freely create new virtual content, but the reasons for this
restriction differ. Allowing social world participants to create content
would pose three risks. 95 First, the expressions of participants might
threaten, obscure or undercut the advertising and marketing efforts to
which these platforms are devoted. Second, if participants in worlds
like Habbo were free to create their own objects, the virtual world
owners would lose their monopoly over sales of virtual objects.
Finally, given that the demographic of social worlds is skewed
toward younger children, companies may wish to ensure that nothing
"inappropriate" appears within the environment. 96 In fact, in some
kid-focused worlds like Disney's Toontown,97 the software restricts
inter-player communications between avatars to only happy thoughts.
In Nicktropolis, the majority of participant communication is
relegated to some form of enthusiasm for the content offering of the
television network. George Orwell's "newspeak" 98 has indeed come
to pass in the Web worlds of today's children.
99
95. A fourth risk is secondary liability for trademark infringement, which is discussed in
Part IV.
96. See Barnes, supra note 93 (describing the parental controls available in some child-
oriented virtual worlds).
97. ToonTown, http://play.toontown.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
98. "Newspeak" is the fictional language that Orwell introduced in his epic 1948 novel,
1984, which catalogues a world where every aspect of life is controlled by the government.
Gwyneth Roberts, Introduction to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Longman Group Ltd. 1983) (1949),
available at http://www.liferesearchuniversal.com/ introduction.html. Newspeak is premised on
the theory that thought depends on the words used to express it. Id. In other words, if certain
words, such as "free" or "liberty", were removed from the language, they would no longer be
thought because individuals would have no way to express those ideals. Id. An example would
be restricting the word "free" to uses regarding price (i.e. "the apple is free") instead of uses
regarding personal rights (i.e. "a people free of government regulation). The newspeak language
was attached to the novel as an appendix; some examples of newspeak, from the book and
subsequent film adaptation can be found at http://www.newspeakdictionary.com/ns-dict.html.
99. See Michael Agger, Ice Ice Baby: My Few Weeks in Club Penguin, A Social
Networking Site for Middle-Schoolers, SLATE, Sept. 14, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2173910/pagenum/all/#pagestart ("For example, it's very difficult to
communicate a number in Club Penguin, which means no ages, no phone calls, no street
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C. The User-Generated Worlds (Second Life)
As the previous two sections summarized, while trademark
issues may arise in game worlds and social worlds, they seem no
more likely to occur in those worlds than they do in expressive works
such as films. If game owners avoid invoking trademarks and place
strong limits on the creative powers of players, they will likely avoid
trademark-related lawsuits.1l° However, user-generated worlds, our
final category of virtual worlds, invite players to create the virtual
environment and do not exert a great deal of control over emergent
virtual economies. This unique policy decision has spawned many
fascinating legal issues involving nearly all bodies of law -
including trademark law.
Without a doubt, Neo and Trinity would find user-generated
virtual worlds appealing. In user-generated virtual worlds, individual
participants are afforded great freedom in defining the shape and
purpose of the virtual environment. The world owner creates very
little content. Instead, what is offered is a largely empty virtual space,
a set of creative tools for authorship and the ability to view (and
purchase) the objects, avatars, games and buildings created by others.
User-generated virtual worlds provide a platform-based
patchwork of multiple authorships and are some of the most vibrant
and bewildering virtual spaces. In the history of text-based virtual
worlds, user-generated worlds can be traced back to object-oriented
MUDs in which users were privileged to create new objects and
environments. 10 1 As Julian Dibbell has explained, these text worlds
could generate a wide range of social conflicts and disputes, including
elaborate quasi-governmental systems. 10 2 The field of user-generated
virtual worlds is much smaller than those of its counterparts and is
dominated'0 3 by one particular virtual world that has captured a
tremendous amount of media attention: Linden Lab's Second Life.
addresses, no interstate rendezvous at Burger King. (I've seen penguins get around this by
misspelling numbers, e.g., 'Im tweleve.')").
100. We should emphasize that the increasing prominence of sanitized and technologically
restricted virtual worlds is a troubling trend, but this concern is not our main focus in this article.
101. See generally Yib's Guide to Mooing, http://www.yibco.com/(last visited March 23,
2008). Perhaps the most well-known MOO is LambdaMOO, which Julian Dibbell described in
his book, My Tiny Life. See JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL
WORLD (1998).
102. See DIBBELL,supra note 101.
103. Another well-known virtual world based on user-generated content is Active Worlds.
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Linden Lab bills Second Life as being imagined and created by
its residents. 0 4 Unlike game or social world owners, Linden Lab
publicly promotes its environment as created entirely by its users.
Linden Lab is the only virtual world owner to expressly vest its users
with rights to the intellectual property that they create while using the
virtual world platform.'0 5 While it is not precisely clear what this
broad grant of ownership rights means, legally, for Second Life users,
this entitlement appears to have played a part in encouraging user
innovation and experimentation within the Second Life
environment.1
0 6
News reports regularly state that Second Life has over 10 million
"residents," but it is misleading to compare this user population
estimate to, for example, the 10 million subscribers of World of
Warcraft. 107 Second Life reports, on its home page, that approximately
500,000 accounts are active in a given week, which suggests that
many of the 10 million total "residents" are currently not actually
using the world. 10 8 In recent months, the total number of user-hours
spent in the environment appears to have reached a (possibly
temporary) plateau. 09
Even at this plateau, the amount of new content generation that
regularly occurs in Second Life is staggering. Cory Ondrejka, the
former CTO of Linden Lab, reported that "[a]s of June 2007,
residents were adding over 300 gigabytes of data to the world every
day, one million distinct items had been bought or sold in the
preceding month, and tens of millions of scripts were running at all
times within the Second Life grid."' 10
104. Second Life, What is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited Feb. 27,
2008).
105. Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations (Nov. 14,
2003), http://lindenlab.com/ pressroom/releases/03 11_14.
106. See generally Cory Ondrejka, Second Life: Collapsing Geography, 2 INNOVATIONS:
TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, Summer 2007, at 27, 28.
107. See Press Release, Blizzard Entm't, supra note 49.
108. Second Life, Economic Statistics, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economystats.php
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
109. See Second Life, Economic Statistics: Graphs, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy-
graphs.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2008). The lack of recent growth in Second Life might be
attributed to the banking crisis, which in turn may have been predicated on the institution of
Linden Lab's anti-gambling policy. See Robin Sidel, Cheer Up, Ben: Your Economy Isn't As
Bad as This One In the Make-Believe World Of 'Second Life,' Banks Are Really Collapsing,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at Al; Candidus Dougherty, Virtual Gambling: Betting on "In-
world" Events, 9 E-COMMERCE L. & POL'Y, Nov. 2007, at 11, reprinted in 6 WORLD ONLINE
GAMBLING LAW REPORT (2007).
110. Ondrejka, supra note 106, at 35.
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The revenue model of user-generated worlds seems to be quite
different than that of social or game worlds. Linden Lab makes its
money by the sale of virtual land where residents develop content."'
A "basic account" membership is free, but, in order to own land, a
user must have a "premium account" membership, which presently
costs $9.95 a month." 2 Currently, fewer than 100,000 individuals
have such accounts or land-owning privileges." 
3
In addition to paying the monthly membership fee, a user must
also purchase the virtual land by paying a flat fee as well as a monthly
"use" fee that is determined based on the size of the land plot. 114 Land
is restrictively created and auctioned to users by Linden Lab, making
it a scarce resource.'" 5 For this reason, it can be quite expensive. For
instance, to purchase a 16-acre "private island" in Second Life, the
cost is $1,675 with a $295 monthly maintenance fee (a land tax of
sorts). 116 Despite these fees, it is unclear whether Second Life is
actually profitable for Linden Lab."l
7
While the company may not be accruing substantial revenue,
some Second Life users do obtain significant profits from their in-
world activities."l 8 Unlike other virtual world owners, Linden Lab
sells its currency to the public and encourages users to buy and sell
custom-crafted virtual objects and structures within Second Life's
virtual economy. 119 The Second Life currency, the Linden dollar, can
be exchanged for cash via the company website at a rate of roughly
111. See generally Cory Ondrejka, Aviators, Moguls, Fashionistas and Barons: Economics
and Ownership in Second Life, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=614663 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008).
112. Second Life, Membership Plans, http://secondlife.com/whatis/plans.php (last visited
Mar. 23, 2008).
113. See Second Life: Economic Statistics,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/economystats.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
114. Second Life, Land Pricing & Use Fees, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ landpricing.php
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
115. Ondrejka, supra note Ill.
116. See Second Life, Land: Islands, http://secondlife.com/community/land-islands.php
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
117. Daniel Terdiman, Second Life scores $11 million in funding, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar.
28, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1043_3-6054598.html ("For now, the company isn't
profitable, and it's not clear when it will be, said Catherine Smith, Linden Lab's director of
marketing.").
118. See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. See also Second Life, Terms of
Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
119. Robert D. Hof, My Virtual Life, Bus. WEEK, May I, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_I 8/b3982001 .htm.
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265 Linden dollars per U.S. dollar. 120 Linden Lab extracts a small
transaction fee from these exchanges, but its primary goal seems to be
ensuring the continuing expansion of its user-generated world and
economy. 1 21
The real currency aspect of the Second Life economy means that
product exchanges between Second Life users are made for real
consideration - a distinction that pushes Second Life business
transactions into the legal definition of commerce. 22 Thus, Second
Life users risk actual loss and can potentially realize substantial gain
through their virtual business dealings.
123
In recent years, Linden has reported that users spend
approximately $600,000 a day purchasing virtual objects and land in
Second Life. 124 In December 2006, Linden estimated that 450
residents generated a monthly income over $1,000 USD,12 5 and it was
reported, more recently, that, in July 2007, 865 users made at least
$1,000 and 145 users made more than $5,000.126 In April 2008,
Linden Lab estimated that 60,000 residents had a positive cash flow,
and about 12,000 of those residents were receiving over 100 dollars in
income.
127
Some of these Second Life business owners have developed their
own Second Life brands. 128 So far, at least one Second Life user (an
120. Second Life, LindeX Market Data, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy-market.php
(last visited Feb. 3. 2008).
121. See Second Life, SL Exchange Fees,
http://www.slexchange.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=4 (last visited
March 23, 2008).
122. It is legally irrelevant that this commerce occurs during the use of a virtual world. See
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that classifying something as a "game" did
not automatically set it outside the "commercial world").
123. See William Marra, Want to Make Money in Second Life? It's Harder Than You
Think, ABC NEWS, Aug. 27, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/Story?id=3527537&page = 1.
124. David Kirkpatrick, Second Life: It's Not a Game, FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2007/02/05/8399120/.
125. Id.
126. Marra, supra note 123. While impressive, these numbers pale in comparison to the
estimated 450,000 users logged on that same month; Second Life, Economic Statistics, supra
note 113. See also Alan Sipress, Where Real Money Meets Virtual Reality, The Jury Is Still Out,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at AOl (reporting that one player in Second Life expected to earn
$60,000 during 2006 from the sale of virtual clothing).
127. Ashlea Ebeling, Taxing Virtual Worlds, FORBES, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2008/04/15/taxes-congress-virtual-biz-beltway-
cz ae_0416beltway.html.
128. See, e.g., Avatarian, LLC, http://www.avatrian.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008)
(selling virtual services including content creation, avatar customization, clothing and
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avatar fashion designer) has successfully registered her Second Life-
based mark for federal trademark protections. 
129
A number of real world businesses have also created a Second
Life presence. Some famous mark owners, like Coca-Cola, have burst
into the Second Life scene by harnessing what users were already
doing with their marks. 130 In its "Virtual Thirst" campaign, Coca-Cola
acknowledged the existing user incorporation of its mark in the virtual
world environment and rechanneled that creative energy to bring the
focus back to Coke products.'31
Unlike Coca-Cola, most real world businesses have not yet
embraced the virtual world culture to the extent of manning virtual
storefronts and selling digital renditions of their products. Many real
world companies have entered Second Life simply to take advantage
of the low-cost advertising opportunities. 132 Real world businesses
can hire a company like Millions of Us, a marketing firm that
specializes in developing virtual world marketing campaigns, to
shepherd them through their Second Life debut.' 33
As in the social worlds discussed above, Second Life users have
an interest in adopting real world brands to outfit their avatars. As a
result, an industry of virtual knock-offs has emerged where users can
purchase everything from an iPod to a Ferrari for their avatars.134 And
that raises a question.
accessories and programming services); Aimee Weber Virtual Content Creation and Services,
http://aimeeweber.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (selling virtual services including texture
work, clothing and accessories, virtual marketing and 3D modeling).
129. Alyssa LaRoche, owner of the Aimee Weber avatar and Aimee Weber Studios,
registered her avatar as a trademark. See U.S. Trademark Serial No. 77110299 (filed Feb. 18,
2007), http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/ tarr?regser-serial&entry=77110299.
130. Virtual Thirst, http://www.virtualthirst.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
131. Id.
132. See Richard Siklos, A Virtual World but Real Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006,
http:// www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/technology/19virtual.html; Martin Davies, Capitalism
Encroaches on Virtual Utopia, GUARDIAN, Jul. 6, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2006/jul/06/guardianweeklytechnologysection.insideit.
133. Millions of Us, http://www.millionsofus.com/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). On its
website, Millions of Us provides a case study of its Second Life marketing platforms for five
large corporations: Microsoft (http://www.millionsofus.com/projects-microsoft.php), Intel
(http://www.millionsofus. com/projects intel.php), Pontiac
(http://www.millionsofus.com/projects_pontiac.php), Scion
(http://www.millionsofus.com/projectsscion.php) and Warner Brother's Records (http://
www.millionsofus.com/projects-wbrecords.php).
134. Benjamin Duranske, Rampant Trademark Infringement in Second Life Costs
Millions, Undermines Future Enforcement (May 4, 2007),
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/05/04/trademark-infringement-virtual-worlds/; Simon Atkinson,
Fighting Fakes in a Virtual World, BBC NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007,
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A beachside cabana in Second Life, framed by palm trees, on
the edge of a vast blue virtual ocean. In front of the cabin is a
bench where an avatar with dark sunglasses lounges. A pair
of Nike sneakers is on the bench next to him. Suddenly,
another avatar floats down from the air above.
A chat window opens and the following dialogue ensues.
Neo: Trinity, I have some Nike sneakers here. You
interested in buying them?
Trinity: Lol. How much 4?
Neo: Oh, I dunno... Hmmm. How about ten Linden
dollars?
Trinity: Cheap! Thx! 100 pairs, pls. I'll sell these Nikes 2
the world n rake in the Lindens!
Let us assume that, in this hypothetical, Neo is not a licensed
distributor of Nike products. Rather, he constructed his virtual
sneakers, uploaded the texture of the Nike logo and affixed the logo
to his virtual object. Nike, the sneaker company, had no knowledge or
participation in the creative process.
Because the virtual economy of Second Life has been
constructed to be real enough to support third-party businesses, Neo's
sale of virtual Nike sneakers to Trinity was arguably a sale in
commerce. Should Neo be concerned about being sued by Nike for
trademark infringement? We explore this question in the following
section.
III. PLAYER INFRINGEMENT
Since the origins of recorded history, people have been using
marks to indicate the ownership or origins of a chattel. 135 The etching
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hifbusiness/6938954.stm; Joyce Schwarz, Bold New Opportunities in
Virtual Worlds, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Mar. 10, 2006, http://www.imediaconnection.com/
content/8605.asp.
135. See ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.01 (2007); Gerard
Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127 (1955); Benjamin G. Paster,
Trademarks - Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551 (1969); Sidney A. Diamond,
The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975). Trademark law,
as we know it, began taking form much later in Sixteenth Century England where artisans
etched their marks into armor, cutlery and cloth products to not only announce the product's
source but also to signify the quality of the product to consumers. See generally Keith M. Stolte,
How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter's Conundrum,
88 TRADEMARK REP..564, 564-65 (1998) (declaring the 1584 case, Sandforth's Case, the oldest
reported trademark case).
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of a potter's mark onto a jar in 3500 B.C. and the modem-day mass-
branding of goods (such as Coke cans and Nike sneakers) serve the
same purpose: both marks identify the source of the product on which
they are emblazoned. The contemporary Lanham Act (which sets
forth federal trademark law in the United States) is based on very old
practices. 136
The goal of trademark law is to protect the exclusivity of source-
identifying marks 37 from those who would make unauthorized uses
of those marks in commerce. 38 It is a business tort based on the need
to promote fair competition. Trademark law is, today, thought to
serve two primary purposes.' 39 First, it prevents the deception of




For instance, let us return to our motion picture example in Part
I.A. If Neo had actually made and sold counterfeit Nike sneakers at a
corner drugstore in Camden, New Jersey (rather than just pretending
to do so within the picture) he would clearly be violating trademark
law. 142 If Trinity bought faux-Nikes, she would assume they were
manufactured by the Nike sneaker company. If the shoes quickly fell
apart (because Neo failed to use quality materials and careful
craftsmanship), Trinity would certainly be annoyed and might vow
never to purchase Nike sneakers again.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). Until the late-1800's, trademark cases in the United States
were uncommon and litigated under common law theories of unfair competition. The first
trademark case heard by the Supreme Court was Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871).
Congress enacted the first trademark statute in 1870 (16 Stat. 210), which was found
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Steffen, 100 U.S. 85
(1879). Now, the Lanham Act, effective as of July 5, 1947, regulates the registration and use of
trademarks in the United States; however, many of the original common law doctrines still apply
as re-codified by the Lanham Act or as tenets of unfair competition law.
137. The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol or device, or any
combination thereof . . . [that is] used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her
goods... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods[.]"
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
138. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Indust., Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 79
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq., protects against just such
unauthorized use of a mark and resultant consumer confusion.").
139. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, at 3-5 (1946); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995); GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 135,§ 1.03.
140. GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 135 § 1, at § 1.03[2].
141. Id.
142. A distinctive mark - either registered (15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000)) or unregistered (15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000)) - can be protected from unauthorized use, or trademark infringement,
if the mark is used, by the infringer, in commerce and in a manner likely to cause confusion
amongst consumers as to the origin of the product. See infra Part III.B.
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Without the benefit of trademark protection, Nike would
probably have little incentive to invest in quality. It might resort to
selling cheaper, lower-quality sneakers because it would have no way
of recouping its investment in its products. In the absence of
trademark law, there would be many Neos who would feel free to sell
consumers like Trinity cheap counterfeit Nikes in lieu of the real
McCoy. This is clearly not a good result for the consumer (Trinity),
the producer (Nike) or society.
This is the traditional justification of trademark law. 143 But, does
it hold up when Neo sells digital renditions of Nike sneakers from a
beachside cabana in Second Life? In some ways, it does.
If we are trying to protect the consumer from being duped, it
seems that, in the Second Life situation, Trinity might actually have
been confused about the source of the virtual sneakers. She could
have mistakenly believed that Nike was the original source of the
virtual products that Neo was selling. Even if she were not confused,
those consumers to whom she later sells the virtual sneakers could be
confused about the origin of those products.
Yet, there do appear to be some important differences between
the real world and Second Life commerce scenarios. For instance,
what constitutes quality with regard to a virtual sneaker? Can a virtual
sneaker have material qualities that are only revealed after purchase?
If not, do we really need to provide incentives for Nike to protect the
quality of virtual footwear?
On the other hand, the Nike mark could, arguably, be subject to
other forms of damage when it is used in a virtual world. What if Neo
were to apply the Nike brand to something a little less wholesome in
the Second Life environment, such as to a bed that allowed avatars to
engage in exotic forms of virtual sex? 144 If Trinity believed exotic sex
beds were sponsored by Nike, she might be less interested in
associating herself with Nike's brand, and she may avoid purchasing
143. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, at 3-5 (1946); Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at
163-64; GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 135,§ 1.03.
144. One of the recent lawsuits concerning trademarks in Second Life was based on a
complex "Sex Gen" bed. See Complaint, Eros, LLC v. John Doe, No. 8:07-cv-0 I158-SCB-
TGW (M.D. Fl. Filed July 3, 2007), available at http://
secondlife.reuters.com/media/SDOC l202.pdf; Elaine Silvestrini, Maker Of Virtual Sex Toys
Takes Online Dispute To Federal Court, TAMPA BAY ONLINE, July 3, 2007,
http://www.tbo.com/ news/metro/MGB9B6AZO3F.html ("He said he sells about 1,000 Sex
Gens a year for the equivalent of about $40 each. As Alderman explained it, a Sex Gen is kind
of a machine that manipulates avatars into various positions."); Francis X. Taney, JR., IP Rights
and Licenses Within Virtual Worlds: Second Life, BRIGHT IDEAS, Winter 2007,
http://www.buchananingersoll.com/news.php?NewslD=2562.
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other Nike products.1 45 This takes us back to similar claims discussed
above with respect to motion pictures.
1 46
Figuring out the implication of sales of virtual Nike sneakers by
virtual world participants is becoming a more pressing question.
Lawsuits concerning activities in virtual worlds are becoming
increasingly common - two recent cases have involved trademark
infringement allegations by Second Life users against other Second
Life users. 141
"Virtual trademark" lawsuits (based on trademarks allegedly
used in commerce within virtual economies) could occur in three
distinct situations:
Traditional (Non-Virtual) Virtual World
TM Use TM Use




Virtual World Scenario #2 Scenario #3
Trademark
("Neokers")
Scenario #1 is the situation described above. Neo has been
selling his own virtual sneakers and branding them with the federally-
registered (real world) trademark, Nike.
Scenario #2 is the flip side of the first situation. Rather than
considering whether traditional marks could be infringed in virtual
145. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006 protects famous trademarks
from unauthorized and non-confusing uses that would either diminish a mark's distinctiveness
(blurring) or harm its reputation (tamishment). 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007). See
infra Part II1.C.
146. See supra Part L.A-B.
147. See, e.g., Complaint, Eros, LLC v. John Doe, No. 8:07-cv-01 158-SCB-TGW (M.D.
Fl. Filed July 3, 2007), available at http:/l secondlife.reuters.com/media/SDOC1202.pdf;
Complaint, Eros, LLC v. Simon, Civ. No. l:07-cv-04447-SLT-JMA (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct 24,
2007), available at
http://www.patentarcade.com/07 10 24 eros et al v simon_complaint.pdf, Hernandez v.
Internet Gaming Entertainment, Ltd., No. 07-21403-Civ-COHN/SNOW (S.D. Fla. 2007); Nick
Abrahams, Issues for Corporates and Regulators in Second Life and Virtual Worlds (2007),
http://www.deacons.com.au/UploadedContentfNewsPDFs/issues-for corporates-andregulators
_.pdf (discussing various virtual world-related cases in both the United States and abroad).
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worlds, we ask whether trademark rights might be gained in virtual
worlds and then extended into traditional markets.
In this scenario, Neo sells virtual sneakers in Second Life using
his own original mark: Neokers. We assume that this term does not
infringe upon any existing trademarks and that Neo does not acquire a
federal registration. After Neo has built substantial goodwill around
the Neokers virtual brand, Morpheus, a real world sneaker retailer and
former Nike employee, starts his own sneaker company and affixes
the Neokers logo to his (real) sneakers.
Scenario #3 is the all-virtual situation. As in Scenario #2, Neo
has established the Neokers brand in Second Life. Trinity
subsequently uses the Neokers logo on her own virtual sneakers,
which she sells only in Second Life.
It is worth noting that, although we might refer to the Neokers
mark as a "virtual mark," as we explain below, some marks used in
some virtual worlds are surely as real as any other trademark. 148 In
those cases, calling a trademark a virtual trademark is not intended to
imply a difference in status or trademark rights associated with marks
originating in a virtual world.
In this Part, we explore how trademark law may or may not
apply to the activities of participants in virtual worlds. We conclude
that some uses of marks in the virtual world, Second Life, could,
potentially, constitute the "use in commerce" and "likelihood of
confusion" necessary to sustain a prima facie case of trademark
infringement or, possibly, lead to alternative forms of trademark
liability for players. 149 We use the aforementioned scenarios to
illustrate our conclusions.
A. Use in Commerce
The threshold issue in applying trademark law to virtual worlds
is determining whether any given "use" of a mark in a given virtual
world environment constitutes a "use in commerce."'' 50 Use in
148. Alyssa LaRoche is a Second Life user who recently was issued a notice of allowance
to register a picture of her avatar as a trademark for "Computer programming services, namely
content creation for virtual worlds and three dimensional platforms." Apparently, LaRoche only
uses her mark in Second Life. See U.S. Trademark Serial No. 77110299 (filed Feb. 18, 2007),
http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/ tarr?regser=serial&entry=77110299.
149. It should go without saying that our discussion here is merely academic and
exploratory. Readers with specific questions about trademark infringement in Second Life (or
otherwise) should seek the advice of counsel.
150. The "use in commerce" requirement serves two roles. First, the "in commerce"
component confers federal jurisdiction to promulgate and enforce trademark laws. Second, the
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commerce is a vitally important question because it is both a
prerequisite for federal trademark protection' 51  (applicable to
Scenarios #2 and #3) and a prerequisite for trademark infringement 152
(applicable to Scenario #1). In this section, we examine whether a
player's use 153 of a mark in Second Life could meet this threshold
requirement by focusing primarily on the acquisition of trademark
rights.
1. Commerce
The Lanham Act defines commerce very broadly. It is intended
to reach to "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress."' 54 As a constitutional matter, this language includes any
activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 55 It is not
limited just to activities normally associated with business or the
pursuit of profit. 1
56
Courts applying trademark law have often failed to limit "use in
commerce" in any meaningful way. For instance, courts have found
that distributing free software over the Internet was a "use in
"use" element establishes ownership of a trademark, which, in turn, creates the right to register
and exclusively use the mark.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Before the most recent amendments to the Lanham Act, the
only way to establish trademark rights was through prior, actual use. Columbia Mill Co. v.
Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1893). Now, constructive use, or a bonafide intention to use in
commerce, is an allowable precondition to commence the registration process, but the registrant
must still demonstrate actual use to finalize registration. Id. In addition to the "use in commerce"
requirement, the mark must be also distinctive, or unique enough to identify the product of a
particular manufacturer and to distinguish it from the products of other manufacturers. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
152. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. R. 1597, 1612 (2007) (noting that, without use, consumers would
not associate a mark with a product and, thus, there would be no need for trademark
protections).
153. See supra Part I.A-B (discussing use of marks in movies, video games and virtual
worlds); Part II.A (discussing product placement agreements between game world owners and
trademark owners); and Part II.B (discussing brand-based social worlds) for a discussion of the
implications of a virtual world owner's use of trademarks in its virtual world platform.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
155. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) ("Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce ... i.e. those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.") (citation
omitted).
156. United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92-93
(2d Cir. 1997) ("'[U]se in commerce' [as used in the Lanham Act] denotes Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause rather than an intent to limit the Act's application to profit-making
activity.").
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commerce" sufficient to establish trademark rights.' 57 The mere act of
establishing a website was even held sufficient, by one court, to meet
the Lanham Act's commerce requirement. 58 Nonetheless, there are
some conceivable limits: in Marvel v. NCSoft the court found that
players participating in a game world environment were not engaged
in commercial activity but instead were playing a game.' 59
The activities of users participating in user-generated worlds,'
60
like Second Life, are likely distinguishable from those of the players
in Marvel. Many Second Life users are playing for real money profit,
whereas the players in Marvel competed to gain in-world status and
esteem - wealth not recognized outside the game world
environment.' 61 Thus, it seems highly probable that at least some user
activities in Second Life (like Neo's sneaker sales) would fall within
any court's definition of use in commerce. 161
In Second Life, specifically, users have the capability of "cashing
out" their virtual assets.' 63 Thus, it would seem that even activities
intended as non-commercial could fall within the jurisdictional reach
of the Lanham Act. In other words, Neo's distribution of his Neokers
sneakers - even if done for free - could undercut another user's
market for virtual sneakers. Neo's free distribution might affect
commerce despite his own lack of a profit motive. 1
64
157. Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194-95 (11th Cir.
2001).
158. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1441-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
159. See supra Part I.
160. As discussed in Part II, game and social worlds either heavily regulate user-generated
content or altogether prohibit it, so it is less likely that a registered trademark would be used by
a user in such an environment.
161. See supra Part Il.
162. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952) (noting the "broad
jurisdictional powers" that the Lanham Act confers on federal courts). All virtual world
trademark uses are also likely to meet the "interstate" portion of the Commerce Clause because
the platforms are available over the Internet on a national or international basis. The district
court, in Intermatic v. Toeppen, explained that " Internet communications transmit
instantaneously on a worldwide basis [and therefore] there is little question that the 'in
commerce' requirement would be met in a typical Internet message."' Intermatic Inc. v.
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Il1. 1996) (quoting GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE § 5.11[2] (1996)).
163. See Second Life, LindeX Market Data, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy-
market.php (last visited Feb. 3. 2008).
164. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1441
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (establishing a webpage and "affecting" the ability to offer nationwide health
and information services were "in commerce"). Also, in Toeppen, the court found that
registering a domain name with the intent to resell it was enough to meet the "commercial use"
requirement. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. at 1239. The court also explained that Defendant Toeppen's
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It is also possible that non-commercial activities within quasi-
commercial virtual worlds could fall within the scope of the use in
commerce requirement because the standard does not require direct
commercial use, just a substantial affect on commerce. For example,
a There user may develop a brand for a clothing line during in-world
play.165 As described above, There is social world with no mechanism
for participants to cash out profits from in-world "sales," but yet it
does seem possible that a There participant could establish goodwill
and an association between her amateur mark and the source of her
virtual products. 166 The participant might use this same mark on a real
world clothing line, on a public website that sells avatar fashions or in
the Second Life market. While her use of the mark in There is not
direct commercial use, it may create brand associations in the mind of
consumers in a way that could affect commerce in markets outside the
There environment and (at least arguably) constitute a "use in
commerce."
2. Bona Fide Use
To establish ownership rights in a virtual mark, trademark
doctrine also requires that a person make a "bona fide" use of the
mark "in the ordinary course of trade" typical in its market. 167 This
use must be "sufficiently public to idehtify or distinguish the marked
goods in an appropriate segment of the public.., even without
evidence of actual sales.' 68
This definition seems extremely broad. If one accepts virtual
economies as fully real and as each containing their own distinct
commercial markets, it might seem as though any use of a mark
within a virtual world would be a use that identifies origin to the
public. 69 Courts are more likely to classify the "market" of virtual
worlds more restrictively, and, looking to Marvel, may lump them all
use of the mark (in the domain name) in the sale of software did not constitute commerce
because such use ended before the passage of the Lanham. Id.
165. See Book, supra note 84 (discussing the There user brands "Oy!" and "Jinx tv").
166. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The Lanham Act defines "use in commerce" as a "bonafide
use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark."
168. New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 418 (1 st Cir. 1951).
169. 'See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1196 (11 th 2001)
(explaining that actual sales and "wide public recognition" were not required when it found that
distributing free software over the Intemet under a mark constituted "use in commerce").
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together as games where players' activities do not constitute a "use in
commerce."1
70
Unlike the virtual world in Marvel, Second Life seems much
more likely to be seen as a commercial forum, rather than a non-
commercial game. Many Second Life users build goodwill in their
virtual brands and establish businesses that produce real profits. 7 '
While game worlds declare that players retain no ownership interest
in virtual objects created during play, Second Life is the leading
virtual world where players are poised to reap real economic
rewards. 72 Therefore, trademark law would seem fully applicable to
these efforts. 1
73
If Second Life is a real commercial marketplace, the issue then
becomes whether those who are building virtual brands have truly
made enough "use" to warrant trademark protection. The sufficiency
of a claim of virtual trademark use would be determined based on a
totality of the circumstances analysis. 74 This type of analysis is
bound to be case-specific, but there are some general rules that might
be applied. For example, a "hobby-use"'175, a de minimis (i.e. "mere
advertising"'176) use, a handful of sales 177 or an internal business use178
170. Marvel Enters. Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (2005).
171. See Book, supra note 87.
172. Ailin Graef, known in-world as Anshe Chung, has proclaimed herself the first virtual
world millionaire. See Paul Sloan, The Virtual Rockefeller, Anshe Chung is Raking in Real
Money in an Unreal Online World, CNN MONEY, Dec. 1, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2-archive/2005/12/0 1/836458 1/index.htm?
cnn=yes; Press Release, Anshe Chung, Anshe Chung Becomes First Virtual- World Millionaire
(Nov. 26, 2006), http:/ www.anshechung.com/include/ press/press release251106.html.
173. See Taney, supra note 144. Mr. Taney has represented several clients who are
engaged in business in Second Life. With respect to use in commerce, he explains:
As an initial matter, there would appear to be no reason why content creators and
other merchants could not obtain trademark protection for marks that have
become distinctive as applied to their virtual goods. These merchants are making
bona fide sales to Second Life users throughout the United States and in
numerous foreign countries using the Internet and so would seem to easily be
able to satisfy the requirement of use of their marks within interstate commerce.
Id.
174. See Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir.
1999) ("The determination of whether a party has established protectable rights in a trademark is
made on a case by case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances.").
175. See Heinemann v. Gen. Motors Corp., 342 F. Supp. 203, 207 (N.D. I11. 1972), aff'd,
478 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1973) (explaining that trademark law requires "a presently existing
trade or business" to acquire an ownership interest in a mark).
176. See Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Consumers Co. of Ill., 169 F.2d 153, 161 (7th Cir.
1948) ("The mere adoption and use of words in advertisements, circulars and price lists and on
signs and stationery give[s] no exclusive right to use.") (citation omitted).
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will not be sufficient to establish trademark rights. On the other hand,
a mark owner does not need a well-established, successful or
profitable business 179 in order to establish ownership.1
80
In our view, a Second Life user who regularly conducts in-world
sales under a recognized brand should meet the use threshold required
to establish trademark rights. Recent court and administrative
decisions seem to support this conclusion. But, even if a Second Life
user established ownership rights, a question would still remain as to
the limits of trademark protection. Are the virtual trademark rights
enforceable only against uses within Second Life, or do trademark
rights acquired in SecondLife extend nationwide?
3. Limits of Protection
Trademark rights have always been territorially defined based on
the use of the mark.' 81 However, under the Lanham Act, the right in a
federally-registered mark may be enforced nationwide-even if the
actual use of the mark is confined to a limited area, whereas common
law trademark protections are limited to the territory where the mark
is actually used in commerce.'
82
If we play out our virtual trademark lawsuit scenarios, we can
see that only Scenario #2 raises an interesting question with regard to
territorial protection. In Scenario #1, we would imagine that Nike,
possessing a federally-registered mark, would be able to enforce its
rights in Second Life and, assuming that Neo's use was an infringing
or diluting use, 183 enjoin Neo's use of its mark. 184 (Since Second Life
is a software platform that resides on 2,000 servers located in San
Francisco and Dallas, it probably would not be found to exist outside
177. See Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
"[a] few bottles sold over the counter .. and a few more mailed to friends" is insufficient use).
178. See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975)
("Secret, undisclosed internal shipments" are insufficient use).
179. See Heinemann, 342 F. Supp. at 207.
180. Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1196 (11th 2001)
(finding that the distribution of free software is sufficient use).
181. See generally United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
182. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1959).
183. Trademark infringement and dilution are discussed in more detail in the forthcoming
sections. See infra Part III.B-C.
184. Cf David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1367-75 (1996) (arguing that the Internet could constitute a
separate jurisdiction for the purposes of trademark law). While we find the arguments of
Johnson and Post thoughtful and interesting, we believe that, give the current state of the law,
courts would be unlikely to accord Second Life an independent jurisdictional status.
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of the jurisdiction of the United States. 85) In Scenario #3, we
presume that Neo, with trademark rights acquired in Second Life,
should be able to enforce his rights against Trinity in Second Life -
again, assuming that Trinity's use was improper and that United
States law applies to the "jurisdiction" of Second Life. 186
A somewhat novel question is posed by Scenario #2. Neo has
been using the Neokers mark in Second Life but not in the "real
world." Would he be able to enforce his unregistered trademark rights
against Morpheus, a real world sneaker retailer, in any location in the
nation? We imagine the likely answer would be yes.
Since Second Life is Internet-based, it would seem that Neo's
rights would also extend nationally across the Web. Maybe limiting
the protection of a virtual trademark to its virtual "territory"-Second
Life-would chart a better policy course, but trademark law does not
seem to recognize "virtual" geographic limitations. 187 So to the extent
such a notion would be accepted as a limitation on virtual trademark
rights, it would probably have to be under the rubric that Second Life
constitutes a separate market, not a separate place.
B. Infringement
Even if any given "use" of a mark in Second Life constitutes "use
in commerce," a mark owner complaining about such use still must
demonstrate that the unauthorized use is likely to cause source
confusion in order to make a prima facie case for trademark
infringement. 8 8 This "likelihood of confusion" test is so subjective
that courts must analyze each case of infringement based on its own
facts.' 89 As Judge Alex Kozinski once put it, courts rattle through a
185. Mitch Wagner, Inside Second Life's Data Centers, INFO. WEEK, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articlelD=l 97800179.
186. Potentially, Trinity might argue that she sold sneakers in a different geographic
region of Second Life, but, for reasons we will not explore here, we doubt such a claim would be
availing given the lack of any real mobility constraints in Second Life.
187. As indicated above, scholars have been debating, for some time, whether the Internet
might be treated as a separate jurisdiction. For the opening salvo, see Johnson & Post, supra
note 184 1367-75 (1996). Johnson and Post argued that cyberspace could-and should-
constitute its own jurisdiction independent of real space territorial sovereignty. They used
trademark law as their lead example. For a recent update of that article, focusing on virtual
worlds, see David G. Post & David R. Johnson, The Great Debate : Law in the Virtual World,
11 FIRST MONDAY, Feb. 6, 2006,
,http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/i 311/1231.
188. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2000) (noting the likelihood of confusion
requirement).
189. Many years ago, the Supreme Court explained in a trademark case that "[w]hat
degree of resemblance is necessary to constitute an infringement is incapable of exact definition,
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non-exclusive list of factors while "performing a Vulcan mind meld
on the 'reasonably prudent consumer' '1 90  to determine whether
confusion as to source is likely.
Each circuit has its own test for "likelihood of confusion," but all
consider three general "types" of factors: (1) intent of the alleged
infringer; (2) actual confusion; and (3) market factors.' 9 In this
section, we discuss the factors used by the Ninth Circuit and how
those factors might apply to our three virtual trademark lawsuit
scenarios. 92 We conclude that Scenario #3 (Trinity selling sneakers
under the Neokers mark) is the most likely of our lawsuit scenarios to
meet the likelihood of confusion test.
1. Sleekcraft
In AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, the Ninth Circuit enumerated
eight factors relevant to determining whether confusion between
goods is likely. 93 It is important to note that this is a non-exclusive
list of factors and courts (in every circuit) do not simply tally the
factors in favor of each party.' 94 Instead, they balance all factors
against each other, so, in some cases, a plaintiff could show likelihood
of confusion if only one or two factors are strongly in its favor. 95
as applicable to all cases." McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877). See also Watkins
Prods., Inc. v. Sunway Fruit Prods., Inc., 311 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1962) ("[T]he likelihood of
confusion is a question of fact.").
190. Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998).
191. See, e.g., Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1999);
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Scott Paper Co. v.
Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple,
747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 259
(5th Cir.); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th
Cir. 1991); AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., I F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1993);
SquirtCo v. Seven-up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcrafl
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs,
Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315
(2003).
192. We have chosen the Ninth Circuit because both Linden Lab and the Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology Law Journal are located in this circuit. While we are using the
likelihood of confusion test from the Ninth Circuit, we have, in many footnotes, cited cases from
other circuits where the factors overlap.
193. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348-49.
194. See Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int'l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir.
1962); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 485 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The
[factors] are a flexible and nonexhaustive list. They do not apply mechanically to every case and
can serve only as guides, not as an exact calculus.").
195. Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The
likelihood of confusion test is an equitable balancing test. While no single factor is dispositive,.
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a. Strength of the Mark
The strength of a trademark is determined based on how
distinctive the mark is; the more distinctive, the stronger the mark.
196
There are four types of protectable marks: arbitrary, fanciful,
suggestive and descriptive.' 97 Arbitrary and fanciful marks are
considered very strong marks and receive wide protection, whereas
suggestive and descriptive marks are considered weak and
infringement is found only when the goods are closely related and the
marks are very similar.
198
Determining a mark's distinctiveness is, again, a highly
subjective test. But, in our scenarios, the classification of the marks
could make a difference in a finding of infringement. In all three, the
marks are identical, but, in Scenarios #1 and #2, the products are
different: sneakers and digital representations of sneakers. Courts
have already considered the Nike mark a very strong mark, 199 and
Neokers is also likely to be deemed a strong mark. 200 Alternatively, if
a court found that Neokers was a weak mark, it is not clear that
infringement would be possible in Scenario #2.
b. Proximity of the Goods
The second factor - proximity of goods - looks to the
likelihood that consumers will associate the goods (if they are closely
related), even though such an association does not exist.201 For
• .and courts may assign varying weights to each of the factors in different cases .... three of
the factors are particularly important: the similarity of the marks, the defendant's intent, and
actual confusion.") (citations omitted).
196. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 349.
197. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (discussing some categories of trademarks). A fanciful mark is a word created solely for
use as a trademark. Example: KODAK. An arbitrary mark is a common word that is applied in
an unfamiliar way. Example: APPLE (for computers). A suggestive mark suggests a particular
characteristic of the goods or services to which it applies but requires the consumer to think
about the mark in order to draw a conclusion as to type of goods or services. Example:
COPPERTONE. A descriptive mark identifies a characteristic or quality of the good or service
and only receives protections once it has acquired a secondary meaning with consumers, as in it
becomes distinctive of the mark owner's goods. Example: VISION CENTER.
198. See 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
§ 82.1 (2d ed. 1950).
199. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993); Nike, Inc. v.
Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
200. Neokers is probably a fanciful mark, but the pronunciation could affect its
classification. For example, if pronounced like Neo's name, it would be: nee-O-kers. However,
if pronounced like: nee-kers, the mark then sounds like sneakers, which describes what the
products are. Thus, Neokers could be considered suggestive or descriptive.
201. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350.
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example, complementary products, goods marketed to the same class
of consumers or goods that "are similar in use and function" are more
likely to create a consumer association.2 °2
Again, proximity causes an issue for the plaintiffs in Scenarios
#1 and #2, as the products are quite different. Yet, it is possible to
view the virtual sneakers as complementary products 20 3 to or
marketed to the same class of consumers 204 as the real sneakers. For
example, virtual world users who wear Nike apparel in real life would
probably be more likely to purchase such apparel for their avatars.
Thus, while the products are very different, the consumers purchasing
the products could be the same, which would increase the risk of
association.
c. Similarity of the Marks
To determine similarity, courts look at the marks based on sight,
sound and meaning as they are encountered by consumers in the
marketplace.05 In our scenarios, the similarity of the marks is a strong
factor for the plaintiffs (either Nike or Neo), since the marks used by
the alleged infringers are identical to the plaintiffs' marks.
d Evidence ofActual Confusion
Showing actual confusion is the most persuasive factor for
demonstrating confusion, but it is also the most difficult to prove.20 6
Courts require a substantial amount of evidence and the actual
confusion itself must be more than minimal.20 7 It is unlikely that the
plaintiffs in our scenarios would be able to meet this burden of proof.
e. Marketing Channels Used
The likelihood of confusion increases if the products are
advertised in the same places, sold for the same prices, sold in the
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding
vegetable tablets and vegetable juice complementary products).
204. See, e.g., Am. Drill Bushing Co. v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 342 F.2d 1019, 1022
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (finding that drill guides and drill bits were marketed to the same class of
purchaser).
205. See, e.g., Sleeper Lounge Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1958).
206. See Sleekeraft, 599 F.2d at 352; Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 798
(6th Cir. 2004) ("Evidence of actual confusion is undoubtedly the best evidence of likelihood of
confusion." (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988))).
207. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352-53. But see Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 904-
05 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding some actual confusion based on affidavits provided by the plaintiff
- even though the evidence was created by the plaintiff).
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same way or sold to the same class of consumers.2 °8 In other words,
this factor involves a comparison of "how and to whom the respective
goods or services of the parties are sold.,
20 9
In our scenarios, this factor weighs heavily for Neo in Scenario
#3, as Trinity would be selling her virtual sneakers in Second Life -
the same market. In order to "compete" in the virtual sneaker market,
she might sell her products in similar forums, in similar ways and for
similar prices.
Scenarios #1 and #2, again, may pose problems for our plaintiffs.
Namely, the products are sold in very different markets - one virtual
and one real - and the prices are likely to diverge significantly. For
example, 10 Linden dollars (the price Trinity paid Neo for virtual
Nikes) is worth about four cents, whereas adult Nike sneakers
typically retail for approximately $75 to $300.210 (We should note that
the sneakers may have been underpriced-apparently the market in
Second Life generally will bear somewhat higher prices for virtual
fashions. 21 ') Real sneakers are typically sold in brick-and-mortar
stores where people can try on the shoes before purchasing them,
whereas there is no concern whether virtual sneakers "fit" an avatar.
There is, however, a potential market overlap in Internet sales
and advertising. Staying with Scenario #1, Nike has an extensive
online store where consumers can purchase a number of sneaker
styles. Second Life users often times also sell their virtual products via
online stores on their personal websites, in addition to selling via in-
world user-to-user exchanges and from virtual boutiques or store
fronts. Additionally, Nike may have its own Second Life presence
where it either advertises its real world products, or sells its own
virtual version of its real apparel. This same type of overlap would
also be possible in Scenario #2 if Morpheus and Neo both used the
Internet or real or virtual world advertising to sell their products.
208. Sleekcrafi, 599 F.2d at 353.
209. See, e.g., Leelanau Wine Cellars v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 519 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 357 (6th Cir.
2006)).
210. See Nike Store, http://www.nike.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
211. For instance, a fashionable gown in Second Life may cost about 1,000 Lindens. For a
gallery of Second Life fashions and prices compiled by the Wall Street Journal Online, see
Second Life Fashions, Wall Street Journal Online,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI 15885055618370073.html (last visited March 27, 2008).
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f Type of Goods and the Degree of Care Likely to
Be Exercised
This factor has to do with whether the products are high-end,
expensive goods or less expensive, impulse-buy or retail goods. 12
The assumption is that, if the products are more expensive, the
ordinary, reasonable consumers purchasing them will be more
sophisticated or, at least, take more care during the purchasing
process . 13 Thus, it follows, that purchasers paying more money, or
purchasing specialized goods, are less likely to be confused. This
"ordinary, reasonable consumer" standard excludes the "indifferent"
consumer but includes "the ignorant and the credulous. '1 4
Again, the difference in the real sneakers and virtual sneakers
becomes an issue for our plaintiffs in Scenarios #1 and #2. The real
Nike sneakers, at least, are quite expensive and are designed with
specific sports or athletic requirements in mind, and, therefore, the
purchasers are likely to be more sophisticated. Following this logic,
likelihood of confusion would be less likely because of the higher
assumed diligence of the consumers.
This logic is particularly relevant here, since, as noted above, the
virtual sneakers could cost mere pennies. The price difference alone is
likely to signal a potential difference in source to the high-end
sneaker purchaser, and vice versa in the case of Morpheus's potential
infringing use of Neo's mark.
However, when the products are from mixed buyer markets like
here (low vs. high), some courts would use the lowest level of
sophistication to determine this factor. 21 5 Still other courts typically
only look at the market of the product with the allegedly infringing
mark.21 6 Thus, a court may look at the virtual sneaker consumers to
determine likelihood of confusion under this factor, and, in that case,
this factor could be favorable to the plaintiffs.
212. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353.
213. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1995)
(discussing consumer sophistication in the context of trade dress infringement).
214. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. See also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Corp., 314 F.2d 149, 156 (9th Cir. 1963) ("The law is not made for the protection of experts, but
for the public -- that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearance
and general impressions." (quoting Stork Rest. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948))).
215. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir.
1991) ("[W]hen a buyer class is mixed, the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably
prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer in the class.").
216. See Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005).
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In Scenario #3, the products are both less expensive, which
significantly increases the likelihood that a purchaser might buy the
virtual sneakers on a whim and be confused as to whom made the
goods. As evidenced by our example, Trinity purchased 100 virtual
pairs of Nike sneakers without much consideration. This might be
because the total purchase would only set her back about $3.75.
g. Defendant's Intent in Selecting the Mark
Courts give significant weight to the alleged infringer's intent.21 7
It is presumed that, if a defendant knowingly copied another's mark,
his intention was to deceive consumers and it is likely that he
accomplished his goal.218 Use alone is not enough to establish bad
intent; the plaintiff must show that the defendant "intended the public
to believe that the plaintiff endorsed or somehow supported its
products or services., 219 Good faith use does not necessarily make
confusion less likely, but a court may consider it when directing the
remedy if infringement is ultimately found.22°
In Scenarios #1 and #3, the alleged infringers (Neo and Trinity,
respectively) know that the mark they have adopted is already being
used by another. If the plaintiff in either case can show that they used
the mark with the intent to dupe consumers, then this factor is likely
to way against the infringers. But, in Scenario #2, it is quite possible
that Morpheus has no idea that the Neokers mark is being used by
Neo in Second Life. Again, the inadvertent or innocent use would not
negate a likelihood of confusion but may mitigate Morpheus's
damages if he is found liable for infringement.
In Scenario #1, it is not necessarily clear that the use of a brand
in relation to a sale in Second Life, even where the alleged infringer is
aware of the "real world" brand, is done with a bad faith intent to
divert sales from the trademark holder. This may be the case, but the
unauthorized use of brands in Second Life might also serve expressive
purposes for the alleged infringer. A participant may want to recreate
his or her appearance in real life, where he or she wears Nike
217. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1542 (1lth Cir. 1986)
(explaining that a defendant's intent "of deriving benefit from the reputation" associated with the
mark could alone be enough to support a finding of likelihood of confusion); Amstar Corp. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS § 729 cmt. f(1938).
218. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354.
219. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2005).
220. See, e.g., Davis, 430 F.3d at 904. This could be the difference between the institution
of an injunction versus a damages judgment, which could be quite expensive.
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products. If Nike-branded virtual products cannot be otherwise
purchased in Second Life, there may be a need for a virtual
entrepreneur to create the mark as a form of virtual self-help. Sales
may serve to help others in meeting their expressive goals.
h. Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines
To determine this factor, courts look to whether either party is
likely to expand its business to produce the same goods as the other
party.221 "[A] 'strong possibility' that either party will expand his
business to compete with the other or be marketed to the same
consumers will weigh in favor of finding that the present use is
infringing.'"
222
As discussed above, many real world businesses are beginning to
enter virtual worlds. Some news reports have stated that Nike has
actually entered the Second Life market and sold virtual sneakers.223
Thus, this factor is likely to weigh in Nike's favor in Scenario #1.
While the same might be true of Morpheus (in Scenario #2)
bridging the gap into the virtual market, it is less likely that Neo is
going to expand from selling virtual sneakers to manufacturing and
selling real sneakers. But, it is not inconceivable that a Second Life
user would take a virtual business to the real world. In Scenario #3,
Trinity and Neo are in the same market and selling the same products.
They are already in direct competition with each other, so this factor
would likely apply neutrally in Scenario #3.
2. Summary of Confusion Factors
As evidenced by the preceding discussion, the "likelihood of
confusion" test seems capable, at least in some circumstances, of
221. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354.
222. Daddy's Junky Music Stores v. Big Daddy's Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 287
(6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d
1100, 1112 (6th Cir. 1991)).
223. In fact, if these stories are true, Scenario #1 may start to look more like Scenario #3.
Steve Woodward, Frequently asked questions Q: What exactly is Second Life?, THE SUNDAY
OREGONIAN, April 1, 2007, at 8-9 ("Q: Who uses Second Life? ... A: ...Corporations,
sensing the commercial potential, also have been setting up shop. Nike and Adidas sell virtual
shoes for avatars."); Lisa Vorderbrueggen, Lawmaker takes next leap: the virtual world of
politics, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, at 3E ("In-world stores sell just about
everything ... Nike sells virtual copies of its products."). But see Benjamin Duranske, Rampant
Trademark Infringement in Second Life Costs Millions, Undermines Future Enforcement,
(2007), http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/05/04/trademark-infringement-virtual-worlds/ (stating
that a search for "Nike" in Second Life reveals many "stores where shoppers can find avatar
shoes bearing the company's distinctive swoosh. Nike itself does not sell any of these shoes").
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fairly straightforward application to Scenario #3. First, concerning
intent, Trinity might conceivably make use of the Neokers mark
knowing that Neo has already adopted it. She may intend to trade off
the goodwill Neo has established in his brand. Second, since both
products are virtual sneakers, it seems likely that some customers may
be confused about the source or origin of the virtual sneakers. Lastly,
Trinity and Neo's uses occur in the same niche market.
The "likelihood of confusion" factors are less clear in Scenarios
#1 and #2, where real world trademarks collide with virtual uses and
vice versa.
Consumers in Second Life will probably not believe that all
branded products within the Second Life environment are endorsed by
the trademark holders. While it seems possible that this type of
confusion would exist, some type of survey evidence would be
necessary to establish that fact. Some participants in Second Life
might not assume that virtual Nike sneakers are a Nike product.
Finally, the difference between real and virtual economies and
markets is significant. The market for sneakers is not the same as the
market for representations of sneakers, and the virtual economy in
Second Life is far different than the online and offline market for real
sneakers. It is not clear that those supplying products and services in
offline markets would be interested in pursuing the sales of the virtual
counterparts of those products and services.
For these reasons, there is a good chance that confusion might
not exist in the case of virtual sales modeled on traditional markets.
We do not mean to suggest that defendants like Neo in Scenario #1 or
Morpheus in Scenario #2 would always be successful in avoiding a
finding of infringement. If actual confusion existed, liability would be
likely. All we are suggesting is that, given the flexibility of the factors
and the gap between real and virtual markets, consumer confusion
may not always be present where one product is real and the other is
virtual.
C. Trademark Dilution
As discussed above, it is not clear that if Nike sued Neo, the
company would be able to establish a claim for trademark
infringement. There may be some inherent differences between real
sneakers and digital representations of sneakers and their respective
markets. It is possible that Nike could fail to produce evidence of
consumer confusion against a defendant that used its mark in a virtual
world.
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However, infringement is not the only means by which Nike
could attempt to enforce its trademark rights. Nike could potentially
bring a claim -for trademark dilution as well,224 and, if it did so, it
would not need to show a likelihood of consumer confusion to make
its primafacie case.225 The focus of dilution is on the defendant's use
of the mark in commerce, rather than on the effect of the use upon the
public. 226 In a suit alleging dilution, the absence of potential confusion
between the sponsorship of real and virtual sneakers would be
unimportant.
While trademark dilution has existed as a theory for over half a
century, it was not added to the Lanham Act until 1996227 and was
substantially modified as recently as 2006 by the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act (TDRA) 8 In this section, we briefly analyze how the
TDRA could apply in virtual worlds. We should note that the judicial
application of dilution remains unclear, since, to date, "only a few
courts have interpreted the TDRA since its enactment, and none
appear to have applied the TDRA at trial. 22 9
1. Dilution Theory and the FTDA
Today, federal dilution protection permits the owner of a famous
trademark to seek injunctive and, in some cases, monetary relief for
the unauthorized use of its mark when such use "impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark" 230 or "harms the reputation of the
famous mark.",23t As its name implies, the purpose of dilution is to
protect a mark from being "diluted," which is generally understood as
a "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
224. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007).
225. Nike would not even need to demonstrate the presence of competition or economic
damages to prevail in a dilution claim. GILSON, supra note 135, § 5A.01.
226. See Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1338-40
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining the difference between trademark infringement and dilution).
227. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2000)).
228. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)).
229. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. CV 99-12980 DDP (MCX), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90487, at *52 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007). Cf Barton Beebe, The Continuing
Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision
Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2008) (evaluating the
results of federal court opinions that analyzed an issue in anti-dilution law).
230. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
231. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
231. Id.
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the public mind of the mark or name by its use on non-competing
goods. 232
Dilution is, in some respects, directly at odds with the underlying
purpose and policy of trademark law. It provides protection of the
distinctiveness and reputation of famous marks, which vindicates a
private property interest without trademark law's corresponding
public benefit of avoiding consumer confusion and deception.233
Due, in part, to its unclear theoretical basis, dilution did not
receive clear federal recognition until it was expressly codified by
statute in 1996.234 Even with a statutory basis, dilution still receives a
"second-class citizenship" status as compared to trademark
infringement235 with some courts criticizing it as impermissibly
creating trademark rights in gross for famous mark owners.236
In 2003 in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., when the
Supreme Court considered dilution for the first time, as laid out in the
then-applicable Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), it set a
nearly insurmountable burden of proof for plaintiffs by requiring a
showing of "actual dilution., 237 In 2005, Congress reversed the
Moseley decision 238  by enacting the TDRA, which loosened a
plaintiffs evidentiary burden to a likelihood of dilution standard.239
232. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927).
233. See Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1339-40
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
234. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) became effective in January 1996. See
Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D. Mass. 1999), aff'd, 232 F.3d
1 (lst Cir. 2000). Interestingly, some courts have applied the injunctive remedies somewhat
retroactively to diluting uses that occurred before the effective date of the statutes. Id. at 126-30
(enumerating other circuit holdings regarding the retroactivity of the FTDA).
235. See 2 GILSON, supra note 135, § 5A.01.
236. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
237. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 (holding that "actual dilution must be established"),
superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007).
238. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d
Cir. 2007) (noting that Moseley's actual dilution standard was superseded by the TDRA).
239. The FTDA standard of actual dilution, as construed in Moseley, still applies when
plaintiffs seek monetary damages for alleged dilution that occurred before the October 6, 2006
effective date of the TDRA. See Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d
296, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Because the TDRA's relaxed likelihood of dilution standard applies
only to pre-October 6, 2006 claims seeking prospective relief, actual dilution under Moseley still
applies when a pre-October 6, 2006 claimant seeks monetary relief."); see also Louis Vuitton
Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 276, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2007). The TDRA
changed the factors to determine fame and likelihood of blurring and denied protection to marks
famous in a "niche" market. H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 8, 25 (2005). According to courts,
however, because the majority of the FTDA remained intact, caselaw interpreting unchanged
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2. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act
Out of our scenarios, a dilution claim would be most likely to
arise from Neo's use of the famous Nike mark on his virtual sneakers
(Scenario #1). To succeed in a claim under the TDRA, Nike would
need to prove that: (1) its mark is famous and distinctive; (2) Neo's
use of its mark on his virtual sneakers is commercial; (3) Neo used
the Nike mark in commerce; (4) Neo's use commenced after Nike's
mark became famous; and (5) Neo's use of the mark is likely to cause
dilution by blurring or tarnishment.24 °
Establishing the "commercial use" elements would be similar to
demonstrating "use in commerce, 24' and, presumably, Neo's use of
the Nike mark post-dated the mark's fame. Nike would probably also
242succeed in showing that its mark is famous and distinctive.
Courts consider factors such as the reach of the mark publicity,
amount of sales under the mark, actual recognition of the mark and
the length of registration in determining whether a mark is famous.
243
Even though these market factors overlap with the elements of
infringement in some circuits, the showing to establish fame in
dilution is higher than what is required to show confusion.
244
sections is still applicable. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. CV 01-1655-
KI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94192, at *67-68 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2007) (explaining that the TDRA
did not "eliminate the requirement that the alleged diluter's mark be identical, nearly identical,
or substantially similar").
240. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007). To receive damages, a plaintiff must
also establish that the defendant willfully intended to either trade on the plaintiffs reputation or
dilute the plaintiffs famous mark. Without a showing of willfulness, the plaintiff can only
receive injunctive relief.
241. See supra Part III.A, for a discussion regarding "use in commerce."
242. Under the TDRA, a mark is famous "if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the
marks' owner." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
243. See id. This is a non-exclusive list. Adidas, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94192, at *71-72.
As a result, what characterizes a mark as "famous" has been - and continues to be -
somewhat unclear under the federal statute. See Kurt M. Saunders, Dilution Revisited: A First
Look At The Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 78 PA.BAR ASSN. Q. 69, 76 (2007); Shari
Seidman Diamond, Trademark Dilution: Of Fame, Blurring and Sealing Wax, With a Touch of
Judicial Wisdom, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 521, 529-35 (2008)
(discussing how courts have dealt with the fame requirement); Jacob Jacoby, Considering the
Who, What, When, Where and How of Measuring Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 601, 615-34 (discussing ways of measuring fame and distinctiveness).
244. Specifically, the test for similarity of the marks is the most dramatic difference
between the dilution and infringement standards. See, e.g., Thane Int'l v. Trek Bicycle Corp.,
205 F.3d 894, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring the mark of the alleged diluter to be "identical
or nearly identical" to the protected mark); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868,
876 ("[A] higher standard must be employed to gauge the fame of a trademark eligible for this
extraordinary [dilution] remedy" (quoting 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 461 (Oct. 1987))); Century
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While "supermarks" like Coca-Cola or Nike are sufficiently
famous to qualify for dilution protection,245 the fame component
would pose a problem for Neo if he attempted to bring a dilution
claim based on his Second Life brand against Morpheus (Scenario #2)
or Trinity (Scenario #3). It would be unlikely that a mark used
exclusively in Second Life could achieve the requisite, nationwide
exposure to meet the fame threshold.24 6 The amount of sales and the
reach of the mark would be limited to a relatively small class of
people - Second Life users. Further, the TDRA expressly removed
the possibility of "niche" fame-the fame of a mark in a particular
niche geographic or market segment. 247 It is doubtful that a mark used
in Second Life could achieve fame under the TDRA if it were not
well-known to those who do not frequent the virtual world.
After establishing the fame of the mark, Nike would still need to
show a likelihood of dilution by either blurring or tarnishment.
"Dilution by blurring" is defined as an "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark., 248 In the context of
purely tangible goods, an example of this type of blurring might be
"Nike Cat Food." While it is unlikely that consumers would believe
that Nike, the sports apparel outfitter, also manufactures cat food, the
use of the Nike mark on cat food could cause the Nike mark to
gradually lose its effectiveness as a source identifier.
21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Group, No. CV 03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9720, at *44-45 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007) (finding CENTURY and CENTURY 21 not
sufficiently similar); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel and Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring an "instinctive mental
association" of the two marks); cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469
(7th Cir. 2000) (applying same test for similarity for dilution and infringement).
245. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875 (quoting I.P. Lund Trading APSv. Kohler, Co.,
163 F.3d 27, 46 (Ist Cir. 1998)):
Dilution is a cause of action invented and reserved for a select class of marks -
those marks with such powerful consumer associations that even non-competing
uses can impinge on their value. . . .[T]o meet the "famousness" element of
protection under the dilution statutes, 'a mark [must) be truly prominent and
renowned.'
See also Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1526 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(finding NIKE famous as defined by the TDRA).
246. See Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Componentone, L.L.C. v. Componentart, Inc., No. 02: 05cvI 122, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89772, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2007).
247. See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449-50 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a
non-famous mark will not receive dilution protection even if the marks in question are identical
and the plaintiff can demonstrate actual dilution).
248. 15 U.S.C.A. § I 125(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007).
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Over time, consumers might develop less faith in the Nike mark
as a proper source identifier if other companies were using the same
mark for their products. Consumers would not be able to readily
associate the mark with the manufacturer of high-quality sports
apparel. 249 Nike might claim that Neo's virtual sneakers have the
same practical effect as Nike Cat Food. The virtual sneakers are a
product offered for sale emblazoned with the famous Nike mark.
Even if consumers are not misled about the source of the virtual
product, they may begin to associate the Nike logo with commercial
agents other than Nike. If Nike could convince a court that it stated a
claim for dilution, by showing a likelihood of blurring, it could enjoin
Neo from selling the virtual Nike sneakers.
It is unclear how courts will apply the TDRA in the context of
virtual worlds-the novel context might lead to some interesting
doctrinal innovations.25 ° Courts could conceivably extend technology-
based distinctions to potential dilution by blurring in virtual worlds.25'
Judge Posner's notion of "dilution by free-riding" offers one way
courts could handle claims of dilution in virtual worlds.252 Dilution by
249. Obviously there seems to be some sort of theory (a rather unscientific one) of
cognition at play here. For a careful exploration and criticism of the pseudo-scientific premises
animating dilution law, see Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 507 (2008).
250. See Nissan Motor Co., LTD v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90487, *55 (Sept. 21, 2007) ("[T]here is no per se dilution rule in the cyberspace context. Put
differently, the rule cannot be that the owner of a famous mark will always be able to enjoin the
commercial use of that mark as a domain name."). In that case, the district court noted that the
nature of the Interet (specifically the availability of search engines) made the risk of dilution
minimal. Id. at *54.
251. Id. at *54 (noting that the TDRA must be interpreted "cautiously" due to its recent
enactment).
252. We admit that we are considering Judge Posner's views on dilution here, in part,
because he is one of the first jurists to boldly venture into Second Life, where he was subject to
fireballs and met a furry humanoid raccoon. For a transcript of the event, see New World Notes,
The Second Life Of Judge Richard A. Posner,
http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/12/thesecondlife.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). In Ty, Inc.
v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002), Judge Posner explained this third type of
dilution as follows:
Third, and most far-reaching in its implications for the scope of the concept of
dilution, there is a possible concern with situations in which, though there is
neither blurring nor tamishment, someone is still taking a free ride on the
investment of the trademark owner in the trademark. Suppose the "Tiffany"
restaurant in our first hypothetical example is located in Kuala Lumpur and
though the people who patronize it (it is upscale) have heard of the Tiffany
jewelry store, none of them is ever going to buy anything there, so that the
efficacy of the trademark as an identifier will not be impaired. If appropriation of
Tiffany's aura is nevertheless forbidden by an expansive concept of dilution, the
benefits of the jewelry store's investment in creating a famous name will be, as
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free-riding focuses primarily on the secondary user's benefit from
using the famous mark.253 In other words, the primary question might
be whether, by putting the mark on his virtual sneakers, Neo was
seeking to trade off the goodwill and consumer loyalty already
associated with the Nike mark.
Virtual world users are likely purchasing the virtual Nike
sneakers because of the mark's goodwill and what the mark
communicates to other users. The virtual Nike sneakers express a
status and help to define the user's online persona and identity.
Without this strong consumer association, the virtual Nike sneakers
have no meaningful value in the virtual world, as product quality
concerns are moot since they are not real sneakers. In other words,
Neo would be getting more than a slight advantage from this pre-
existing association: his virtual business success might be based
almost entirely on Nike's goodwill.
Dilution by free-riding is not formally recognized in the TDRA
and has only been pondered by Judge Posner as a form of common
law dilution. 4  It is possible that subsequent Lanham Act
amendments will include it,255 but, for now, Nike is limited to
pursuing claims for dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment,
the second type of dilution included in the TDRA.
"Dilution by tarnishment" as an "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark., 256 While tarnishment can
occur when a mark is used in association with a lower quality product
or when a mark is portrayed in an unflattering way,257 plaintiffs have
economists say, "internalized" - that is, Tiffany will realize the full benefits of the
investment rather than sharing those benefits with others - and as a result the
amount of investing in creating a prestigious name will rise.
253. Ty, 306 F.3d at 512.
254. In Ty, Judge Posner noted:
This rationale for antidilution law has not yet been articulated in or even implied
by the case law, although a few cases suggest that the concept of dilution is not
exhausted by blurring and tarnishment .. .and the common law doctrine of
"misappropriation" might conceivably be invoked in support of the rationale that
we have sketched.
Id. (citations omitted).
255. But see 2 GILSON, supra note 135, § 5A.01[2] (describing the Seventh Circuit's
discussion of dilution by free-riding a "misunderstanding of blurring").
256. 15 U.S.C.A. § 125(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2007).
257. These "shoddy product" cases have involved situations where the marks were nearly
identical and the plaintiff and defendant were competitors. See, e.g., Jordache Enters v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1492 (10th Cir. 1987). See also Jacoby, supra note 243, at 634-39.
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been more likely to succeed in claims for the latter type of
tarnishment.
258
Many tarnishment claims arise from attempts at humor where
defendants use the trademark in a parody or pun; a use that implicates
both fair use and First Amendment concerns. 259 The tarnishment
analysis is fact-specific, but courts are more likely to find uses that
are disgusting or vulgar or that associate the mark with obscenity,
sexual activity or criminal behavior to be actionable as tarnishment.26 °
But, "tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct. ' '26 1 For instance,
the Second Circuit found that a casino's use of the NYSE mark in
association with gambling services could constitute tarnishment.262
Neo's use of Nike's mark on his virtual sneakers is not a use that
should tarnish the Nike mark. However, if Neo were to use Nike's
mark on a bed that allowed Second Life users (through their avatars)
to engage in exotic forms of virtual sex, Nike could potentially prove
263tarnishment. The more legally interesting cases of tarnishment
would likely involve uses of the mark where the virtual world user is
poking fun at the mark or just using the mark during imaginary play.
As discussed in the next section, these cases invoke First Amendment
concerns and could qualify as a form of fair or protected use.
D. Player Defenses
Thus far in this section, we have concluded that trademark
infringement via player activities in virtual worlds is possible.
However, in our initial example of Neo and Trinity in the restaurant,
we claimed that individuals might have the intuition that the realms of
258. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting the two
traditional types of"tamishment").
259. See infra Part III.D.
260. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) (pornographic film where actresses wear the uniforms of Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (t-shirts
and underwear with GENITAL ELECTRIC and the GE logo); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's
Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (BUTTWISER logo); Gucci Shops, Inc.
v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (GUCCI GOO diaper bags).
261. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC., 293 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)).
262. Id.
263. One of the recent lawsuits concerning trademarks in Second Life was based on a
complex "Sex Gen" bed. Complaint, Eros, LLC v. John Doe, No. 8:07-cv-01 158-SCB-TGW
(M.D. Fl. Filed July 3, 2007), available at http:// secondlife.reuters.com/media/SDOC 1202.pdf;
Silvestrini, supra note 144, ("He said he sells about 1,000 Sex Gens a year for the equivalent of
about $40 each. As Alderman explained it, a Sex Gen is kind of a machine that manipulates
avatars into various positions."); Taney, supra note 144.
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personal fantasy should be outside the realm of law. Nevertheless,
within virtual worlds that feature user-generated content and legally
"real" economies, trademark infringement and dilution appear to be a
real possibility.
A question then might be whether users who would be otherwise
liable for trademark infringement or dilution might have a legal basis
to claim special immunities from liability. In other words, might there
be some defenses that protect otherwise infringing uses of marks in
the context of commercial and virtual activities? In the context of
virtual worlds, the most promising defenses are the doctrines of
trademark "fair use" and constitutional free speech guarantees.
In this section, we discuss how these defenses could apply in the
context of player trademark infringement and dilution in virtual
worlds. Unfortunately for players, we conclude that both of these
defenses appear to offer fairly weak (if any) protection. It seems
unlikely that these defenses would protect activities, such as Neo's
sale of virtual Nikes, that might be deemed infringing under the above
analysis.
1. Fair Use
Unlike in copyright law where certain educational, minor and
non-commercial uses are exempted from infringement liability, 264 no
general statutory definition of "fair use" is included in the Lanham
Act as an exception to trademark infringement liability. 265 In fact,
264. Copyright holders enjoy broad rights to prohibit others from copying, displaying,
performing or otherwise exercising the exclusive statutory rights they are granted by federal law
in relation to their works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (setting forth exclusive rights). These
rights are limited only by "fair use" rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (setting forth the
copyright "fair use" test). Copyright protections (which apply generally to books, music and
film) are commonly confused with trademark protections (which apply, as explained above, to
indications of the source of goods and services). See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) In
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 583-84 (2005) (noting the confusion that occurs
when courts fail to recognize these distinctions). It is understandable then that individuals
confused about the difference between trademark and copyright might expect trademark law to
also include certain "fair use" rights that limit the powers of trademark holders.
265. As discussed infra Part III.D.2, the TDRA does have an explicit statutory fair use
provision that applies to trademark dilution, but that provision does not clearly define the notion
of fair use even in the context of dilution. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007).
There is also a statutory defense that looks somewhat like a "fair use" defense to an assertion of
trademark incontestability. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2000) (allowing a defense based on use
of "a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party").
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until recently, it was not clear that "fair use" even existed as a
substantial doctrine in trademark law.266
In 2004 in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v Lasting Impression I,
Inc., the Supreme Court acknowledged, for the first time, that "fair
use" was a viable defense in trademark law and that it was not simply
another way to state that a claimant failed to meet the requirements of
267infringement.
Although KP Permanent held out a potential larger role for "fair
use" rights in trademark law, the "fair use" defense has historically
been limited to situations where defendants have used descriptive
language in ways that have not been intended to inform consumers
about the source or origin of a product. 268 Defendants used the mark
to describe their own products, rather than to reference or to associate
with the mark owner's products. 269 These trademark uses were
deemed fair because, essentially, ordinary words were used to convey
their ordinary meaning, instead of being used in their trademark
sense.
270
For instance, a museum might want to sell athletic wear bearing
the image of the Nike of Samothrace. If the use of the term "Nike"
was made in a good faith effort to sell this type of product (and not a
bad faith effort to capitalize on the Nike brand or to mislead
consumers), the museum should be entitled to use the word "Nike" in
describing its athletic wear. This would be a traditional form of "fair
use" in trademark law. According to KP Permanent, this type of use
266. Fair use was first acknowledged as a defense to trademark infringement in 2004 in
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004), but has not
been codified in the Lanham Act. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act, enacted in 1996, and its
subsequent 2006 amendment, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, both include fair use as a
defense to trademark dilution. See infra Part III.D.
267. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 112.
268. See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]he use
of words for descriptive purposes is called a 'fair use,' and the law usually permits it even if the
words themselves also constitute a trademark."); Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Cheeseborough-
Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997) (fair use "permits others to use protected marks
in descriptive ways, but not as marks identifying their own products").
269. See New Kids on the Block v. New Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F. 2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992) (describing "classic fair use [as a case] where the defendant has used the plaintiff's mark
to describe the defendant's own product").
270. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28, cmt. c (1995); 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:45 (4th
ed.); KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 122 (noting that the Lanham Act gives "no indication that the
[statute] was meant to deprive commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of descriptive
words").
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might be fair even when it entails some likelihood of consumer
confusion. 271
The Ninth Circuit also recognizes another variant of "fair use" in
the trademark context: the so-called doctrine of "nominative fair
use." 272 Under this doctrine, articulated in New Kids on the Block v.
News America Publishing Inc, an infringer can escape liability in
situations where it references the trademark to describe the mark
owner's product in order to legitimately sell its own products or
273services.
In New Kids, the infringers were newspapers that had used the
name of the then-popular pop band to conduct a poll that asked
readers: "Who's the best on the block?" 274 Readers were offered a
900-number where they could pay to vote, and profits gained through
the poll were allegedly given to charity.275 The court found that the
newspapers' use was nominative fair use because the rock group was
not readily identifiable without the use of their mark; the newspapers
only used so much of the mark as was reasonably necessary; and the
newspapers did not suggest that the rock group sponsored or endorsed
their poll.
276
Because liability for infringement should not attach without the
likelihood of confusion, it is questionable whether this type of fair use
offers a substantive defense, or whether it simply reformulates in the
negative the required showing of likelihood of confusion.2 77 So far,
the Third Circuit is the only other circuit to expressly adopt a similar
doctrine.278
In any event, to the extent that a coherent notion of fair use exists
in trademark law, it would offer little defense to infringement liability
271. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116-17. In fact, the Court heard this case because there
was disagreement among the circuits regarding whether the defendant must show that there was
no confusion; some circuits found this a necessary showing, while others did not. Id.
272. New Kids on the Block, 971 F. 2d at 308.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 304.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 308.
277. See Brother Records v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that
when consumer confusion is likely, there is no "nominative fair use" defense available).
278. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005)
(adopting the defense generally but laying out a revised test); Id. at 233 ("The majority, stating
that the Ninth Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to craft a test for nominative use, mildly
rewords that test and recasts it as an affirmative defense.") (Fisher, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Cf KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
115 (2004) (declining to address the issue of nominative fair use); Universal Commc'n. Sys. v.
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007).
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for players in virtual worlds. It would most likely not apply, at all, to
any of our three virtual trademark lawsuit scenarios. Other
circumstances (such as if Neo built a reproduction of a Greek temple
and charged for admission to his "World of Nike") might raise the
possibility of a trademark fair use defense to infringement. However,
players seeking to escape infringement liability in the scenarios we
outlined above will likely need to look beyond fair use.
2. TDRA Fair Use
Unlike with infringement, the TDRA explicitly enumerates an
exclusion from dilution liability for "any fair use," which includes
nominative and descriptive fair use and the facilitation of such fair
use, provided that the player is not using the mark to designate the
source of his or her own products. 279 Specifically, the TDRA permits
advertising comparisons 280 and the "identifying and parodying,
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods
or services of the famous mark owner.",28 1 Thus, fair use may provide
a sustainable defense to dilution liability if the use were to occur in
the context of "commentary."
Like the rest of the TDRA, it is unclear how courts will manage
to reconcile these statutory protections for parody and comment with
an apparent concomitant extension of liability to uses that are deemed
to "blur" and "tarnish" famous marks. For instance, if Neo were to
claim that his sale of virtual sneakers for Lindens was a parody
directed at revealing the lack of material substance in contemporary
fashion, would a court find this convincing? What if Neo were to
include, as a feature of the sneakers, an audio file that criticized
Nike's advertising practices or a link to a website that parodied the
Nike website? What if the Nike sneakers were to automatically self-
immolate after a month's use-would this be a commentary or their
quality or an attempt to tarnish the Nike mark?
At present, with sparse guidance on how to interpret the TDRA
fair use provisions, one can only wonder what courts will do when
presented with such questions.282
279. 15 U.S.C.A. § 11 25(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007).
280. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i).
281. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
282. The Fourth Circuit has taken a stab, recently, at interpreting the fair use and parody
provisions of the TDRA in a case involving "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys. See Louis Vuitton
Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). In that case, claims of
both blurring and tamishment were found to fail. Id. at 268-69. The opinion offers fairly broad
protection to defendants who parody famous marks. "In short, as Haute Diggity Dog's 'Chewy
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3. Free Speech
In a recent article, Judge Pierre N. Leval has argued that there
should be no conflict between trademark law and the First
Amendment . 3  Judge Leval explains that trademark law has
developed as a common law doctrine that has historically been
attuned to the importance of free speech protections.284  After
considering several well-known cases that find conflicts between
trademark law and the protections of the First Amendment, 285 Judge
Leval argues that no conflict would have occurred if trademark law
had been interpreted correctly.286 Judge Leval's approach would seem
perfectly reasonable if trademark law today were limited to its
traditional scope.
Because trademark law theoretically regulates only deceptive
commercial speech and the Supreme Court has made clear that
deceptive commercial speech can be banned outright,28 7 trademark
law might well be interpreted as raising no significant conflict with
free speech protection. 28 8 As Judge Alex Kozinski put it: "Whatever
[F]irst [A]mendment rights you may have in calling the brew you
make in your bathtub 'Pepsi' are easily outweighed by the buyer's
interest in not being fooled into buying it."
2 89
While this approach is supported by traditional common law
jurisprudence and by legacy Supreme Court opinions,290  few
contemporary courts have endorsed the proposition that trademark
law is categorically immune to conflicts with the First Amendment. 2
Vuiton' marks are a successful parody, we conclude that they will not blur the distinctiveness of
the famous mark as a unique identifier of its source." Id. at 267. The court found no evidence
that the parody tarnished the reputation of the Louis Vuitton mark. Id. at 269.
283. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark. Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187
(2004).
284. Id.
285. E.g. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
286. Leval, supra note 283, at 202-04.
287. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
288. See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 737 (2007).
289. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993).
290. Tushnet, supra note 288, at 744-48.(summarizing the jurisprudence but concluding
that the issue has received "inconsistent and shallow treatment").
291. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Instead, courts have adopted approaches that recognize potential
conflicts between trademark law and the First Amendment.292
Because commercial speech, or speech that "proposes a
commercial transaction,",293  enjoys a lesser degree of First
Amendment protection,294 most decisions addressing free speech
defenses to infringement have involved speech that was not purely
advertising.295 Since the Lanham Act's definition of "use in
commerce" extends to expression falling outside the range of
commercial speech, courts have had to examine how to balance the
rights of trademark owners (and the interests of the public) against the
claims of parties making use of trademarks. 9 6 Many of these cases
involved the assertion of trademark rights in relation to expressive
works, such as music and films, which, despite the fact that they are
produced in pursuit of profit, receive greater First Amendment
protection than mere commercial speech.29 7
An early approach, which often produced results unfavorable to
defendants, was to examine whether "alternative avenues" existed for
the defendant to express ideas without using the plaintiffs
trademark.298 The Second Circuit used this test in Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.29 9 where it considered the
defendant's use of the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleader uniforms in the
film Debbie Does Dallas and determined that "[b]ecause there are
numerous ways in which defendants may comment on 'sexuality in
athletics' without infringing plaintiffs trademark, the district court
292. Tushnet, supra note 288, at 738-39; Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks
and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 993
(2007) ("[T]he trend appears to be away from reliance on a straight likelihood of confusion
analysis in cases of noncommercial speech.").
293. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion).
294. Tushnet, supra note 288, at 737-38.
295. Eileen Hintz Rumfelt, Political Speech: Priceless - Mastercard v. Nader and the
Intersection of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 55 EMORY L. J. 389, 399-402 (2006)
(discussing parodies and nominative fair use defenses to trademark infringement); Mark V.B.
Partridge, Trademark Parody and the First Amendment: Humor in the Eye of the Beholder, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 877, 882-89 (1996) (distinguishing between commercial and non-
commercial speech and noting some relevant cases).
296. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494
(2d Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); Rumfelt, supra note 295,
at 393-94 (discussing balancing test).
297. Tushnet, supra note 288, at 738-39.
298. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (discussing the "adequate
alternative avenues of communication" test in the context of leafleting at malls).
299. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d.
Cir. 1979) (extending Lloyd Corp. to apply in the context of trademark infringement).
VIRTUAL TRADEMARKS
did not encroach upon their first amendment rights in granting a
preliminary injunction. 3 °°
While other courts have endorsed the "alternative avenues" test
set out in Pussycat Cinema,30 1 ten years later the Second Circuit
distinguished its own opinion on the basis that it contained "blatantly
false advertising. 30 2 In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court stated that the
existence of "alternative avenues of communication" was, on its own,
an insufficient basis to completely avoid First Amendment
considerations.30 3
In Rogers, the Second Circuit considered a claim by actress
Ginger Rogers who alleged that a film entitled "Ginger and Fred"
violated her trademark interest in her own name.30 4 As a matter of
trademark doctrine, there was "nothing to the Lanham Act claim. 30 5
Nonetheless, the court still framed its decision against Rogers with
the observation that "overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the
area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values" and therefore
the court was required to "construe the Act narrowly." 306 This
approach, which seeks to balance trademark and free speech interests,
has been accepted by several other circuit courts.30 7
Finding the Rogers balance has become increasingly difficult by
the expanding protections granted to trademark owners by statutory
enactments and judicial doctrine.30 8 In particular, the enactment of
federal protections against trademark dilution, which is not dependent
on any evidence of consumer confusion or deception, raises serious
concerns about the intersection of trademark and free speech.
300. Id.
301. Barrett, supra note 292, at 991 (discussing the adoption of the "alternative avenues"
test).
302. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 996.
305. Id. at 999.
306. Id. at 998.
307. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1989) (describing the "the overall balancing approach of Rogers"); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); Barrett, supra note 292, at 1000; Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e find [the Rogers v. Grimaldi test] the most
appropriate method to balance the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion with the
public interest in free expression.").
308. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1710-11 (1999).
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Courts adopted ways to cabin the concept of dilution and
reconcile it with the First Amendment0 9 Now that Congress has
attempted to reinvigorate the doctrine with the TDRA, courts will
almost assuredly need to continue grappling with the doctrine. While
some commentators are confident that the language of the TDRA will
prevent conflicts with free speech,31 ° only the development of the case
law will confirm or reject these opinions.
Any potential "narrowing" or "balancing" of trademark rights
with First Amendment interests is unlikely to offer players falling
within our three virtual trademark lawsuit scenarios any significant
protections. For example, if Neo advertises and sells Nike-branded
sneakers to other players within Second Life and the purchasers
believe that these products are endorsed and sponsored by the
footwear company, it is hard to see how this usage raises any novel
First Amendment questions. Indeed, it is conceivable that a court
could classify Neo's use of the Nike mark as commercial speech, but
such a finding is not likely.
As with fair use, there could certainly be other uses of marks
within virtual worlds that might lead a court to struggle with First
Amendment issues. For instance, what if Neo created and sold
admission to virtual spaces involving athletic competitions, and some
of the figures in his virtual spaces wore Nike athletic gear? If
trademark law were to prevent this type of creativity, it would seem to
pit Neo's interest in creative expression against trademark law. But, it
is unclear that trademark doctrine would actually extend to prohibit
this kind of expressive use, since the mark is used as part of a
fabricated tableau.
In summary, it seems that neither fair use nor free speech offer
any blanket protection that could immunize participants in virtual
worlds from potential liability for trademark infringement. Otherwise
infringing commercial use of a mark in a virtual world is unlikely to
309. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) ("[A]ctual dilution
must be established."); Mattel v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting the federal dilution statute to apply only to "purely commercial" speech that
proposes a commercial transaction).
310. Dale M. Cendali & Bonnie L. Schriefer, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006: A Welcome-and Needed-Change, 105 MiCH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 108, 108
(2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol I05/cendali.pdf.
Some have argued that the changes to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the
'FTDA') embodied in the recently enacted Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 (the 'TDRA') threaten to infringe upon the right to free speech. This is
simply not the case. The FTDA has always protected First Amendment rights,
and the TDRA clarifies and strengthens those protections.
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be recast as a fair use, and, generally speaking, deceptive speech is
not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, while some virtual
world trademark uses could be influenced by these defensive
doctrines, truly commercial activity that generates confusion or
dilution of protected marks seems perfectly capable of leading to
liability under existing trademark law.
IV. SECONDARY LIABILITY
If trademark infringement and dilution are viable claims within
the virtual economies found in virtual worlds, this raises the question
of whether a virtual world owner could -potentially be held
secondarily liable for its users' infringements. In theory, this is
possible even if the virtual world owner were not a direct participant
in the activity. There are four types of secondary liability claims that
could be brought against virtual world owners: contributory31' and
vicarious 312 trademark infringement and contributory31 3 and vicarious
dilution.314 Because vicarious infringement 31 5 and contributory and
311. Contributory trademark infringement is a common law doctrine derived from general
tort law theories of unfair competition and joint tortfeasor liability and, though not expressly
codified in the Lanham Act, has been recognized by courts since as early as 1890. See 3
GILSON, supra note 135, § Il.02[2][h][i][A] (2007); Socidt6 Anonyme Distillierie v. W.
Distilling Co., 42 F. 96 (C.C.E.D. 1890) (finding liability where party "was intentionally
instrumental" in causing the infringing sales).
312. Vicarious liability is based on common law principles of agency and joint enterprise.
The doctrine was first endorsed by the Seventh Circuit in Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the theory in situations
where the parties are partners or "have authority to bind one another in transactions with third
parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product").
313. In Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, the lower court inferred that, "like
contributory infringement, contributory dilution requires a showing of inducement or supply.
The defendant must have either induced another's conduct or continued to supply a product after
the defendant knew or should have known that it was being used to dilute the plaintiff's
trademark." Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions, 175 F.R.D. 640, 645-46 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(citations omitted), affd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind &
Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 n.28 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that no
appellate court or statute has established a cause of action for contributory dilution).
314. No federal or state court has defined the elements of vicarious dilution, however,
John T. Cross, in his article, Contributory and Vicarious Liability for Trademark Dilution,
suggested that vicarious dilution could occur in four situations:
First, a defendant who specifically orders or directs someone under his legal
control to use a mark is liable for any resulting dilution. In addition to employers
and principals, franchisors might be subject to vicarious liability under this
standard. Second, joint tortfeasors should be vicariously liable for all acts of
dilution contemplated by the parties in their agreement. Third, an employer
should be vicariously liable for acts of her employees to the full extent
contemplated by the Second Restatement of Agency. Finally, principals should
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vicarious dilution 31 6 are less commonly alleged today than standard
contributory infringement, we focus exclusively on contributory
trademark infringement, which seems more applicable to the virtual
world context.
It is important to stress that primary infringement liability is a
necessary predicate for establishing secondary infringement
liability.317 One district court has already written an opinion on the
issue of secondary trademark infringement liability in a virtual game
world (Marvel v. NCSoft) and rejected the plaintiffs claims on the
basis that the players had made no "use in commerce" of the marks.
318
As discussed above, player liability for direct infringements in virtual
worlds does not seem impossible. In user-generated content worlds
like Second Life, one could imagine that the "use in commerce"
hurdle could be overcome in some instances.
In this section, we will explore whether a virtual world owner's
somewhat ancillary involvement in virtual world commerce could
lead to secondary trademark infringement liability. If direct trademark
infringement is possible in virtual worlds, we conclude that a claim
for contributory trademark infringement against the virtual world
owner would also be possible.
be liable for acts of their agents performed in furtherance of the agency
agreement and from which the principal derives a direct benefit.
John T. Cross, Contributory and Vicarious Liability for Trademark Dilution, 80 OR. L. REV.
625, 643 (2001).
315. Vicarious liability in the trademark context is (generally) construed as limited to
situations where parties have a business partnership or principal-agent relationship. Mark
Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of
Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1370
(2006) ("Absent a principal-agent relationship between the defendant and the direct infringer,
the defendant cannot face exposure to vicarious liability."). Not all circuits have endorsed the
theory of vicarious liability for trademark infringement. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. Winback &
Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1432-33 (3d Cir. 1994) (declining to recognize any
theory of secondary liability in trademark law other than the contributory liability test
announced by the Supreme Court in Inwood.).
316. Only a handful of courts have acknowledged the possibility of contributory and
vicarious dilution, and those decision were not made in the context of the recent TDRA
amendments to the Lanham Act. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194
F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging the possibility of contributory dilution but noting that
no case has ever been decided on that basis); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Scis. v. Network
Solutions Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997). For a general discussion, see Cross, supra
note 314.
317. See Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th
Cir. 1990) ("Contributory infringement necessarily must follow a finding of direct or primary
infringement."); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.0 (2d ed. 1996) ("For a defendant to be
held contributorily or vicariously liable, a direct infringement must have occurred.").
318. Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSofl Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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A. Claim Feasibility
As many commentators have noted, with the growth of the
Internet, it has become increasingly attractive for holders of
intellectual property rights to bring suit not against direct infringers
(who can often be hard to identify and reach) but instead to sue
service providers and content hosting sites. 3 19 If successful, a lawsuit
against a service provider can accomplish the valuable goal of ceasing
infringing uses of multiple individual users without extensive
individualized litigation.
320
In response to this growing litigation trend, Congress enacted
some limited immunity provisions for service providers.321 Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") provides
"information service providers" with some significant protections
from liability for hosting third-party defamatory speech that might
otherwise give rise to claims of defamation, violations of rights of
publicity and other state law claims.322 The CDA also declares that it
319. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 101 (2007); Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 315, at 1364. But see Columbia
Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In Columbia Insurance, the
district court explained that suing an Internet service provider for contributory liability is "most
often not productive" because the service provider either lacks the requisite knowledge or is
otherwise immune from liability. Id. at 578 n.l. The district court's opinion was referring to
three different types of service provider secondary liability that stemmed from hosting
defamatory statements as well as material that infringed both copyright and trademark law. Id.
320. In the ongoing litigation between Tiffany's and Ebay, discussed further herein,
Tiffany claimed to have litigated several hundred infringement claims against individual users.
Technology and Marketing Law Blog, Tiffany v. Ebay Post Trial Briefs,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/12/tiffanyvebay.htm (Dec. 20, 2007, 7:45 PST).
321. Congress expressly provided that at least one of its goals in creating service provider
immunities was to facilitate the expansion of the Internet; such expansion would be severely
constrained if service providers feared secondary liability for the acts of their users. See S. Rep.
No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998) (stating that one purpose of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
was to "facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the digital age"). Congress explained
that The Communications Decency Act furthered:
the policy of the United States-
(I) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media [and]
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered
by Federal or State regulation.
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1), (2) (2000).
322. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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shall have "no effect on intellectual property law." 323 Therefore, the
CDA has no relevance to service providers who are faced with federal
contributory trademark infringement claims. 324
Congress partially addressed the exposure of service providers to
intellectual property claims by the passage of the "safe harbor"
provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").3 25
The DMCA provides a "notice and takedown" procedure that lets
service providers avoid liability for copyright infringement.326 The
DMCA is not the DMTA, and, as its name implies, it only applies to
matters of copyright law.
327
Thus, in the case where a virtual world owner is charged with
contributory trademark infringement by virtue of the direct
infringement of a user, there is no statutory scheme in place to
provide special immunities.328 Surprisingly, such immunities may not
be necessary: most commentators have observed that secondary
liability for trademark infringement has been much less favorable to
plaintiffs than schemes from other areas of online tort and intellectual
property law.
329
323. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000) ("Nothing in [the CDA] shall be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property."); Lemley, supra note 319, at 103 ("The IP
exemption from section 230 creates a gaping digital hole in Internet intermediary immunity.").
324. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that Section 230 does not apply in the context of contributory trademark infringement).
325. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
326. Id See also Perfect 10, Inc.v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1174-82
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing the service provider immunities in the DMCA in detail).
327. IQ Group v. Wiesner Publ'g, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D. N.J. 2006) (refusing
to turn the "DMCA into a species of mutant trademark/copyright law, blurring the boundaries
between the law of trademarks and that of copyright [when there] is no evidence that Congress
intended such an extreme outcome in enacting the DMCA").
328. DMTA-like schemes have been proposed recently in student notes. See Lauren
Troxclair, Note: Search Engines and Internet Advertisers: Just One Click Away from Trademark
Infringement?, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1365, 1404-06 (2005) (proposing a trademark notice
procedure to be followed by search engines); Fara S. Sunderji, Note, Protecting Online Auction
Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany
Inc. v. Ebay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 941 (2005) ("[T]his Note proposes that
Congress enact a safe harbor provision that protects online auction sites from contributory
trademark liability if they comply with a three-part statute based on knowledge, financial
benefit, and prompt take-down procedures.").
329. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 315, at 1365 ("While recent years have
witnessed a dramatic broadening of the scope of secondary liability principles with respect to
copyright law, no such move has occurred in the trademark arena."); Cf Lemley, supra note
319, 115-16 (advocating that the secondary liability standards from trademark law should be
applied broadly as a general form of Internet safe harbor for information hosts and service
providers).
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But, even if the trademark framework is more favorable to
virtual world owners than other regimes, this does not mean that
claimants will be unsuccessful. In the copyright infringement context,
adverse judgments on the issue of secondary liability have resulted in
the closure of well-known businesses.330 Thus, the potential for
contributory trademark infringement liability is not something that
virtual world owners can afford to ignore.
We have already seen one trademark holder, in the Marvel suit,
seek to impose secondary liability for trademark infringement on the
owner of a virtual world.33' If virtual worlds continue to expand as
they have over the past several years, we should expect to see more
such suits in the future. In order to predict how these might play out,
we need to look to the relevant case law.
B. Inwood
The doctrine of contributory infringement was first explained
and endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case of Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.332 Inwood involved a
manufacturer that supplied a generic drug that resembled, but did not
infringe, a non-generic and branded prescription drug sold by the
plaintiff.333 Some pharmacists had marked the defendant's drug with
330. See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, LTD., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Napster was found liable for
contributory copyright infringement. When its appeal failed, it was forced to take down its
service to comply with the injunction prohibiting it from further facilitation of the trading of
copyrighted material. It ultimately settled for $26 million plus a $10 million advance of future
royalty fees. Bertelsmann, Inc., the company that funded Napster after its lawsuit and through its
bankruptcy proceedings, recently reached a settlement agreement of $150 million for its
contributory copyright infringement suit stemming from its support of Napster. See In re
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, www.leibersettlement.com (last visited March 29, 2008).
Grokster closed down its service and agreed to a $50 million settlement. Xeni Jardin, Grokster's
End and the Future of File Sharing, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Nov. 8, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyld=4994285.
331. Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft, Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
332. Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). Initially, secondary
infringement liability could only be imposed if a party had intentionally induced trademark
infringement. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1924). This
limited inducement standard was expressly expanded to include a "knowledge and means"
standard in the early-1980's. See generally Jason Kessler, Correcting the Standard for
Contributory Trademark Liability Over the Internet, 39 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 375, 380-
81 (2006). This knowledge and means standard of contributory liability had been previously
recognized by the lower courts, but Inwood was the first time that the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged it. See e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980,
989 (D. Mass. 1946), affd by, 162 F.2d 280, 287 (1st Cir.).
333. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 849-51.
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the plaintiffs brand before distributing it to prescribing doctors and
patients.334
The Supreme Court stated that a party could be liable for
contributory trademark infringement in two ways.335 First, that party
might induce those in its supply chain to infringe a trademark.336 It
could also be held liable for "continu[ing] to supply its products to [a
party that] it knows[,] or has reason to know[,] is engaging in
trademark infringement[.],, 337 Relying on the factual findings of the
district court regarding the pharmaceutical sales in question, the Court
found that the defendant was not liable.338
The Inwood case, of course, involved tangible chattels, which are
not found in virtual worlds. While (virtual) manufacturing supply
chains for virtual products certainly exist,3 39  these
manufacturer/distributor relationships do not describe the present
relationship between virtual world owners and commercial sellers in
user-generated content worlds. More often, the virtual world owner
provides something that more closely resembles a space, a tool or a
service. This raises the question: does Inwood apply to situations
involving intangible services as well as to. relationships involving
tangible products?
The Supreme Court has not addressed this question. Certain
language in the Court's 2004 opinion in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.34 ° suggests that tangibility may be more
important to trademark law than most courts assume. In Dastar, the
Supreme Court resolved a claim that involved what the Court saw as a
conflict between an expired copyright interest and a claimed
trademark interest. The Courted stated that the trademark claims were
properly limited to confusion over the identity of "the producer of the
tangible product sold in the marketplace. 34'
334. Id. at 849-50.
335. Id. at 853-54.
336. Id. at 854. Inducement in the context of virtual worlds is certainly a theoretical
possibility, but it seems highly unlikely.
337. Id. The Court found no evidence suggesting that the manufacturer knew, or had
reason to know, that the retailers were mislabeling and passing off the products as authentic. Id.
at 854-55.
338. Id. at 854-55.
339. In fact, many game world economies involve complex supply chains where certain
player avatars gather raw (virtual) materials, others use acquired skills to craft and improve
those raw materials and still others market and distribute the final products.
340. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
341. Id. at 31.
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In the case of virtual worlds, many, if not all, virtual objects are
protected by overlapping copyright and trademark interests. This
raises the question of whether the intangibility and copyright
protection of virtual properties may lead the Court to toss trademark
plaintiffs out of court by reading in similar bright line barriers
between copyright and trademark law.
In any event, the federal circuit court opinions, post-Inwood, do
not limit contributory infringement liability to defendants who supply
tangible products to infringers.342 On several occasions, Inwood has
been applied where the defendants owned and supervised physical
spaces - making contributions of services rather than of tangible
products.343
In the leading case of Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corporation v.
Concession Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit found that a flea
market owner could be held liable where one of its vendors had sold
counterfeit Hard Rock t-shirts from a rented booth.344 The Seventh
Circuit struggled with the application of Inwood, given that the
defendant had not provided materials but simply space and
facilities.345 Ultimately, the court found contributory liability could be
applied.346
The Seventh Circuit based its decision, in part, on tort law cases
involving landlord/licensor liability for torts committed on real
property, which assigned contributory liability to a landlord or
licensor who knew, or had a reason to know, that its tenant/licensee
was engaging in tortious behavior on its premises.347 Since this was
analogous to the type of duty that the Supreme Court had endorsed in
342. See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143
(7th Cir. 1992); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
343. See generally Deborah J. Peckham, The Internet Auction House and Secondary
Liability: Will eBay Have to Answer to Grokster?, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 977, 986-89 (2005)
(collecting cases).
344. Hard Rock Cafi, 955 F.2d at 1146, 1150. Ultimately, the court remanded to the
district court for a factual determination as to whether the flea market owner knew, or had
reason to know, that the vendor was selling infringing goods.
345. Id. at 1148. The court explained that it was, at that time, unclear how Inwood applied
"to people who d[id] not actually manufacture or distribute the good" ultimately palmed off but
instead provided the facilities where infringement occurred. Id.
346. Id. at ll51.
347. Id. at 1148-49. The court noted that the parties did not agree on the relationship
between the flea market owner and the primary infringer: the flea market owner claimed it was a
landlord-tenant relationship, whereas Hard Rock characterized it as a licensor-licensee
relationship. This distinction proved immaterial, since the same standard applied to both
primary-to-secondary infringer relationships. Id. at 1149.
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Inwood, the Seventh Circuit concluded that landlords and licensors
should also be subject to the same knowledge and means standard.348
A few years later in Fonovisa, Inc v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit followed suit by adopting the Hard Rock "vicarious
liability" reasoning when it found that a swap meet operator could be
held liable when third-party vendors openly sold counterfeit
recordings on its premises.34 9 Subsequent district court opinions have
continued to apply the Hard Rock and Fonovisa expansion of Inwood
to defendants who have allowed others to infringe trademarks within
their proprietary spaces.35 °
This raises a familiar question to scholars of Internet law: is
cyberspace a "place" such that the standards announced in Hard Rock
should apply to it? 351 This question is further pressed by the fact that
virtual worlds are not merely "cyberspatial" in the manner of websites
or email but are actual simulations of three-dimensional spaces.
Virtual worlds are technologies where cyberspatial references
accurately reflect the way that users understand the environment.352
348. Id The court did not agree with the trial court that this "reason to know" standard
created a duty to prevent infringing behavior. Id. The trial court found that the flea market
owner had been "willfully blind" to the tortious behavior of its vendors and failed "to take
reasonable steps to detect or to prevent the sale of [infringing materials]" and imposed
contributory infringement liability on that basis. Id. at 1148 (quoting the "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law" provided by the trial court).
349. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996). Unlike in Hard
Rock, there was no doubt that the swap meet operator knew about the rampant infringement
occurring on its property: the sheriff's office had raided the swap meet and seized more than
38,000 counterfeit recordings and then notified the swap meet operator, in writing, about the
continuing, post-raid sale of counterfeit materials. Id. at 261. Poignantly, the court explained: "a
swap meet [operator] can[not] disregard its vendors' blatant trademark infringement with
impunity" and could be held liable because it "suppl[iedl the marketplace" where the counterfeit
goods were sold. Id. at 265.
350. See, e.g., Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp. 648, 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding a legally sufficient claim for trademark infringement against the owner
of real property where the tenant-retailer sold infringing goods); Habeeba's Dance of the Arts,
Ltd. v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (finding a valid claim for
trademark infringement against a rental facility when it hosted a dance recital with an infringing
name).
351. For additional reading on this topic, see Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 214 (2007); Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L.
REV. 23 (2006); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521
(2003); Michael J. Madison, Rights ofAccess and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433
(2003); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000).
352. The Second Life platform includes spatial devices such as stores, clubs, buildings and
parks and, in many respects, purposely mimics real life, or a user's "first life." Linden Lab
fostered this sense of "place" through how it structured its platform and by encouraging its users
to build whatever they like on their "blank canvas" of land. Second Life, Community: Land,
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The flea market in Hard Rock and the swap meet in Fonovisa
are, in many ways, exactly the type of social space that, for instance,
Linden Lab has created in Second Life. Linden Lab controls a virtual
space where participants offer each other a conglomeration of random
goods and services.353 Linden Lab charges admission fees for buyers
and sellers and supervises its virtual land.354 While it may be a stretch,
it would not seem impossible for a court to simply apply real property
caselaw like Hard Rock and Fonovisa to a virtual space such as
Second Life.355
C. Inwood Online
Most courts have, so far, taken a somewhat different approach in
situations pertaining to websites and online auctions, which make it
more likely that virtual worlds will be treated pursuant to these
existing cases.356 One of the early cases applying Inwood online was
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.357
In Lockheed, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Hard Rock and
Fonovisa to stand for the notion that the "supplies a product"
component of the Inwood test should be replaced with "direct control
and monitoring of the instrumentality" when the alleged secondary
infringer provided a service rather than a product.358 Therefore, under
this extension, an online service provider would be liable for
http://secondlife.com/ community/land.php (last visited March 29, 2008). Linden promotes the
hodgepodge of in-world businesses by providing Classifieds and a Showcase of current hot
spots. Second Life, Community: Classifieds, http://secondlife.com/community/classifieds.php
/(last visited March 29, 2008); Second Life, Second Life Showcase, http://secondlife.com/
showcase/(last visited March 29, 2008).
353. See supra Part IL.C (discussing the in-world format of Second Life).
354. See supra Part II.C (discussing the different types of Second Life membership
accounts and land ownership fees and services).
355. Second Life, Community: Classifieds & Second Life, Showcase,
http://secondlife.com/community/classifieds.php and http://secondlife.com/ showcase/(last
visited March 29, 2008).; Cf Sunderji, supra note 328, at 932:
Tiffany could also argue that the tort law analogy from Hard Rock Cafe applies
even though eBay's premises are virtual. EBay, like a traditional landlord,
maintains self-contained premises to which it has permitted individual sellers to
enter. Therefore, it too should be responsible for the torts committed by those
permitted entry onto its property.
356. Cf Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357
(2003) (suggesting that courts should adopt a "physical" rather than "virtual" perspective on
Interet law issues).
357. Lockheed Martin Corp v. Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).
358. . Id. at 984. The court found that a domain name registrar was not contributorily liable
where its customers used its service to register a domain name that infringed on an unconstested
service mark. Id. at 983, 987.
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contributory infringement liability if it directly controlled and
monitored the instrumentality where the alleged infringement
occurred.
The Lockheed Court found that the defendant's domain name
routing service did not entail the necessary control and monitoring to
establish liability where the users had used the service to register
infringing domain names.359 First, the court explained that the
infringement had actually occurred through the use of the plaintiff's
mark on a website, not through the use of the defendant's service (the
publication of routing tables).36° Second, it was not feasible for the
service provider to monitor its users' activities because this would
require the onerous task of "monitor[ing] the Internet. 361 Such an
expectation was, according to the court, far less reasonable than
requiring a landlord to monitor a tenant's use of a specific plot of
property.
362
Notably, the Lockheed opinion expressly rejected the application
of real property-based theories in the context of Internet-based
363
services. But, other courts have been less explicitly hostile toward
this analogy.3 64
The Lockheed court also contrasted the role of a domain name
registrar with that of an Internet service provider (ISP) and opined
that an ISP's role in facilitating trademark infringement was more
similar to the flea market and swap meet operators' roles because the
ISP provided "actual storage space and communications for [the]
359. Id. at 984-85.
360. Id. at 985. The court equated the registrar's role in domain name routing to that of the
United States Postal Service by explaining that "[the registrar] does not supply the [infringing]
domain-name combination any more than the Postal Service supplies a street address by
performing the routine service of routing mail." Id at 984-85. See also Size, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (E.D. Va. 2003) (following Lockheed and finding that
Network Solutions was a "routing service" and not liable for the third-party registration of an
infringing domain name).
361. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 985.
362. Id. at 985.
363. Id. at 985.
364. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 n.1 (N.D. Cal.1999)
(analogizing the relationship between an internet service provider and its user to "renting from a
landlord who makes available offices in an office complex"); Ford Motor Co. v.
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646-47 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (referring to a domain
name registrar as a "cyber-landlord" after considering whether to apply the "'flea market'
analysis from Hard Rock and Fonovisa'"; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 268, § 25:20 ("The issue is
whether online auction sites which host some sellers who sell infringing and/or counterfeit
goods, are liable for infringement. The principles of the landlord cases could be applied.").
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infringing material. 36 5 This registrar/ISP distinction was picked up a
couple years later by the Southern District of New York in Gucci
America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates.366 In Gucci, an ISP provided
website hosting services to a customer that sold fake Gucci products
on its website.3 67 Relying in part on the Lockheed registrar/ISP
comparison, the district court found that a valid contributory
infringement claim could be made against an ISP due to its hosting of
trademark-infringing content.
368
Since virtual worlds and Internet service providers offer
analogous types of services, it is possible that courts will apply the
reasoning of Gucci to the context of virtual worlds. As described in
the earlier case of Columbia Insurance Company v. Seescandy.com,
decided in the Northern District of California, the basic services
provided by ISPs can be divided into two categories of accounts:
access and presence. 369 The Seescandy.com court explained that
access accounts consisted of services such as Internet access and
email, whereas "presence" accounts allowed users to "rent space and
services" from service providers.37 °
Virtual world accounts can be similarly categorized. In Second
Life, for instance, the software permits "access" to the user-generated
content of others, the virtual business market and the social
experience of chat and avatar co-presence. Using Second Life also
entails "presence" on Linden's servers by an avatar or by purchasing
and developing virtual land. The major difference between virtual
world platforms and Internet service provider platforms is the
technology used: virtual worlds use dynamic, three-dimensional
simulated environments instead of more static, two-dimensional
websites. Thus, fitting virtual worlds into the existing (albeit rather
365. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 962.
366. Gucci Am. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 416. The court also rejected the ISP's assertion that it was immune from
contributory infringement liability pursuant to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. § 230. Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 412-15.
369. Columbia Ins, 185 F.R.D. at 578 n.1.
370. The court stated:
Access services consist of an account through which the client can access the
Internet and send e-mail. A presence account generally includes hard drive space
that permits the client to have a webpage or file transfer site. Persons who wish to
run a site at their own domain, rather than at the domain of their service provider,
can either make the significant investment in computer hardware, networking
hardware, and high-speed access necessary to make their domains available on
the Internet or can rent space and services from a service provider.
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unclear) "online service provider" box, as defined in Lockheed, is
probably a much easier task than creating a new "virtual" service
category that is somewhat closer to the brick-and-mortar than to
digital.
It is important to note that the Lockheed test applied by the Ninth
Circuit is not applicable in all jurisdictions. 37' However, if we assume
that virtual worlds will be treated pursuant to the contributory
infringement standards envisioned in the Ninth Circuit, then the
recent case of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service
Association, offers the applicable standard.37 2 The standard, under
Perfect 10, is whether the virtual world has "[d]irect control and
monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the
plaintiffs mark.,
373
At this point, determining control and monitoring would depend
on the facts. The case law in this area is not highly developed and
those jurisdictions which have pronounced on the issues have tended
to eschew clean categorical distinctions. 374 Additionally, many cases
where contributory infringement claims were brought under the
Lockheed test have failed.375
Yet, the typical virtual world owner likely has a greater degree of
control over the virtual world environment than the service provider
in Lockheed. Certainly, infringement could not occur in virtual worlds
if owners did not provide the access, storage space and virtual
371. As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted a national
standard.
372. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
373. Id. at 807.
374. See, e.g., id. (finding that a credit card payment processing service lacked the
requisite degree of control and monitoring over the primary infringer websites that used its
service); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689-90 (D.
Md. 2001) (finding that a web-based hotel reservation booker lacked the necessary degree of
control and monitoring over an affiliate's website); Ford Motor Co. v. Great Domains.com, Inc.,
177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (declining to extend contributory trademark
infringement to a cybersquatting, domain name auction site); Acad. of Motion Pictures Arts and
Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding a domain
name register not liable for contributory trademark infringement because it lacked actual
knowledge that the suspect domain names were involved in infringing activities, since there had
not yet been a determination as to whether there was direct infringement). But see Gov't
Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (D. Va. 2004) (finding that the
claim that an Internet search engine, which sold advertising linked to trademarks, monitored and
controlled the third-party advertisements was enough to support a claim for contributory
trademark infringement).
375. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807; Peckham, supra note 343, at 986-89, 994, 1003.
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376
currency, of some form, that can be converted into real money. In
fact, the control of virtual world owners seems to surpass even that of
the ISP in Gucci377 in that virtual owners not only provide the
instrumentality of infringement (the service) but also host the
commercial marketplace itself.378 Thus, it appears likely that a virtual
world owner could have the requisite degree of control necessary to
establish liability under Lockheed.
D. The Requirement of Knowledge & "Precautionary
Measures"
While the flea market cases seem to suggest that landlords can
be liable for activities occurring on their property, it should be
emphasized that the Inwood test does not simply extend liability
based on facilitation.379 Under Inwood, a defendant should know, or
have reason to know, that there is direct trademark infringement.38 °
In the case of Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences v.
Network Solutions, Inc., the district court refused to find knowledge
of infringement where a domain name registrar simply offered its
service "to individuals and companies who may participate in
infringing activity" by registering trademarked names.381 The court
explained that the registrar could not possibly know of the
infringement, since there had "yet to be a determination as to whether
or not the domain names ... infringe[d] the Lanham Act.',38
2
This requirement, carried over, could provide a fairly strong
shield for many virtual world owners.383 In many virtual worlds, the
owner may be unaware of specific acts of trademark infringement or
even be confused (understandably) about the standards for trademark
infringement in virtual spaces.
376. See e.g., Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807; Fare Deals, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 689; Ford
Motor, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 645; Acad of Motion Pictures, 989 F. Supp. at 1280. See generally
Peckham, supra note 343, at 986-89, 994, 1003.
377. Gucci America v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
378. But see Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807 (finding that a credit card payment processor's
ability to stop processing payments to websites with infringing content did not, "without more,"
constitute direct control but failed to define "more").
379. See supra Part II (discussing in-world commercial marketplaces).
380. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807.
381. Acad of Motion Pictures, 989 F. Supp. at 1280.
382. Id.
383. Interestingly, the allegedly infringing domain names at issue in Academy of Motion
Pictures were theoscars.net, academy-awards.net and similar combinations of the trademarks
OSCARS and ACADEMY AWARDS. Id at 1278. The trademarks were registered, well-known
and hardly appear unprotectible.
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An additional defense might exist if a virtual world owner were
able to convince a court to apply the protections related to "innocent
infringement" by printers, publishers and broadcasters.384  The
exception applies to "paid advertising matter" in the context of
"electronic communication" and limits the remedies available
injunctive relief in the case of "innocent infringers." '385 While this
provision may not seem a perfect fit for infringement in virtual
worlds, it was applied, by one court, to the activities of the online
auction eBay.386 The potential scope of the provision has been largely
untested online, but, if virtual world owners could avoid damages via
secondary liability by establishing that they were "innocent"
publishers of "paid advertising matter," this would constitute a
significant reduction in the severity of their risks.
It should be noted that courts may differ about whether specific
virtual world owners are innocent.387 Presumably, the virtual world
owner would not be innocent if it had a "reason to know" of specific
acts of infringement.388 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have already
found that "willful blindness, ' 389 or "suspect[ing] wrongdoing and
deliberately fail[ing] to investigate,', 390 has established the requisite
knowledge of trademark infringement required for a finding of
liability.39' This .shows that the determination of what constitutes
sufficient knowledge can be quite flexible.
384. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2000).
385. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(B).
386. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
387. Lemley, supra note 319, at 101-07 (noting that it is not clear what constitutes
"innocent" infringement in the Lanham Act); Cf Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095
(premising the determination that eBay was "innocent" on the finding that eBay had "no
affirmative duty to monitor its own website for potential trade dress violation and Plaintiff had
failed to put eBay on notice that particular advertisements violated his Lanham Act rights before
filing suit.").
388. Courts look to whether "a reasonable person in the defendant's position would realize
either that fit] had created a situation" that would likely result in infringement or that it "was
dealing with a customer whom [it] should know would be peculiarly likely to use [its] product
wrongfully." Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass.
1946), aff d, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947); Power Test Petrol. Distribs., Inc. v. Manhattan &
Queens Fuel Corp., 556 F. Supp. 392, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
389. Willful blindness is affectionately known as the "Ostrich Rule."a nod the way that
ostriches like to stick their heads in the sand to avoid danger.. (The editors at Wikipedia inform
us that no one has observed an ostrich doing this in recent history. See Wikipeadia, Ostrich,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostrich (as of May 5, 2008, 12:37 GMT)).
390. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1992) (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989)).
391. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996). See also
Cartier Int'l B.V. v. Ben-Menachem, No. 06 Civ. 391 (RWS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95366, at
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While the "reason to know" standard "does not impose any duty
to seek out and prevent violations[,]y 392 it does trigger a reactive duty
where a defendant should reasonably suspect infringement. Under the
Inwood standard, once a supplier has a reason to know of the direct
infringement, it should institute "precautionary measures ' 393 and can
avoid secondary liability only by implementing "effective measures to
prevent infringing uses."
394
For example, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the effectiveness of a
manufacturer's remedial measure (affixing a source-identifying label)
in Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc.395 The court found this remedial
measure inadequate because the label could not easily be seen and
was often covered up when the products were displayed by
retailers.396
The Sealy case was not an online case, but, instead, a case
involving the more traditional manufacturer-distributor relationship
found in Inwood. It is not clear what constitutes an "effective
measure" in the online service provider context. The current case of
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., being litigated in the Southern District of
New York, may shed some light on this topic.
397
The eBay service seems like a better (though still not exact)
analogy for the services provided by virtual world owners than the
aforementioned "traditional" Inwood relationship. The eBay service
differs from virtual world services in that neither the products nor
sellers on eBay are being simulated in a three-dimensional space, but
it resembles a virtual world (at least one like Second Life) in that the
business economy of the website is premised on facilitating a diverse
and user-generated "flea market" of buyers and sellers engaging in
commerce. Both eBay and Second Life seem analogous, systemically,
to the bazaar economies at issue in Hard Rock398 and Fonovisa.399
*32-33 (S.D.N.Y. January 3, 2008) (confirming the application of willful blindness to
contributory trademark infringement); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybemet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp.
2d 1146, 1188-89 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (same).
392. HardRock, 955 F.2d at 1149.
393. Coca-Cola, 64 F. Supp. at 989.
394. Scaly, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). In Sealy, a




397. Tiffany, Inc., v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607 (RJS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan 18, 2004). See
also Katie Hafner, Tiffany and eBay in Fight Over Fakes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at C9.
398. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs, 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
399. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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In the Tiffany case, Tiffany is suing eBay for trademark
infringement due to eBay's alleged facilitation (by way of its auction
system) of its users' sales of counterfeit Tiffany products. 400 The
dispute between Tiffany and eBay has been ongoing since at least
2003 when Tiffany discovered a so-called "rat's nest" of sales of
counterfeit goods in eBay's auctions. 40 1 Thus, Tiffany has a well-
developed record of evidence dating back to when it began using
eBay's infringement complaint process.40 2 According to Tiffany, it
has brought hundreds of individual enforcement actions and filed
hundreds of thousands of trademark infringement complaints with
eBay-but the "rat's nest" of infringement remains.40 3
In the Tiffany case, eBay seems fully aware that trademark
infringement and counterfeiting is occurring in its online auction.40 4 It
also seems to have substantial control over the instrumentality of
infringement.405 The case then seems to boil down to one point: is
eBay's remedial program40 6 enough to excuse it from being held
liable for the acts of infringement that occur on its auction site?
40 7
If trademark infringement is fairly commonplace in a given
virtual world, similar questions may need to be asked... and
answered. For example, monitoring user activity in a virtual world,
like Second Life, is certainly technologically feasible, but requiring
Linden to actively ferret out all trademark infringement would seem
tantamount to "monitor[ing] the Internet," a task the Lockheed court
found unreasonable.40 8 At what point do the cases that state that a
service provider, in the online context, has no affirmative obligation
400. Tiffany (NJ), Inc., v. eBay, Inc., No. 04-4607 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). See also Hafner,
supra note 397.
401. Id. In its post-trial brief, Tiffany's refers to the eBay auction system as a "rat's nest"
of infringement. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 1-2, Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, No. 04 Civ.
4607 (RJS) (Dec. 7, 2007). For more information regarding Tiffany's investigation efforts or
either party's legal arguments, see the post trial briefs,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/l 2/tiffany_v ebay.htm.
402. See Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 12, Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, No. 04 Civ. 4607
(RJS) (Dec. 7, 2007).
403. Id.
404. See id. at 10.
405. See id. at 16.
406. eBay protects intellectual property through its Verified Rights Owner (VeRO)
Program, which permits users to report auction listings that infringe their rights. eBay, How
eBay Protects Intellectual Property (VeRO), http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/programs-vero-
ov.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
407. See Hafner, supra note 397.
408. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999).
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to monitor for infringement 40 9 conflict with cases that require those
who are aware of the risk of infringement, in the offline context, to
take precautionary measures 410  to prevent infringement from
occurring?
E. Considering Second Life
As we explained in Part II, activities amounting to actionable
trademark infringement seem likely to occur with more frequency in
virtual worlds that feature more user-generated content, less game-
play and economies that are more closely integrated with real
economies. Because user-generated virtual worlds seem more likely
to host directly infringing content, they also seem more likely to raise
the potential for contributory liability.
The December 2007 issue of WIPO Magazine (produced by the
World Intellectual Property Organization) features a cover story on
trademark infringement in Second Life and states that: "Avatars can,
for example, purchase from "enterprising" residents virtual NIKE
shoes bearing the distinctive Swoosh Design... notwithstanding that
Nike... may not have consented to the creation and sale of the
virtual property exploiting their trademarks." 4 " Because trademark
owners concerned about infringement in virtual worlds may see
Linden Lab as a prime target for suit, we would like to briefly discuss
how trademarks seem to be policed at present in Second Life.4t2
Linden Lab has taken some steps with respect to trademark
infringement, as demonstrated by its own statements. Like almost all
online businesses, Linden has formulated and posted policies and
contractual terms it applies to the use of its services.4t 3 Currently,
409. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
410. See, e.g., Scaly, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
411. See Rector et al., supra note 1, at 13.
412. It should go without saying that our discussion here is merely academic and
exploratory. Readers with specific questions about trademark infringement in Second Life
should seek advice of counsel.
413. Service regulation and policy enforcement by a compilation of governing agreements,
similar to those provided by Linden Lab, is typical in virtual worlds. Andrew Janowich,
EULAw: The Complete Web of Corporate Rule-Making in Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 5-6 (2006) (providing the survey results of a study of the governing
agreements from forty-eight virtual worlds). This method of service management has been
likened to the creation of a private law -- and even to framing a constitution -- whereby
operators, like Linden, "govern" their virtual worlds. Id. at 5; Julian Dibbell, OWNED!
Intellectual Property in the Age of eBayers, Gold Farmers, and Other Enemies of the Virtual
State or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the End-User License Agreement,
http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/owned.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (posting of a paper
presented at the "State of Play" conference, New York University Law School, Nov. 2003).
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Linden's Terms of Service (TOS)4 14 and Knowledge Base4 15 touch
upon trademark law issues.4 16
The TOS makes mention of trademark rights in Section 2.3,
where Linden forbids a user from selecting an account name that
"violates any trademark right" and states that "Linden Lab reserves
the right to delete or change any Account Name for any reason.or no
reason." 4 17 Section 2.3 also, like the terms of service of most online
business, purports to shift all legal responsibility for potential
infringement to the user: "You [, meaning the user,] are fully
responsible for all activities conducted through your Account or under
your Account Name. '41 8 Section 3.2 expressly prohibits trademark
infringement while informing the user that he or she is solely
responsible for understanding how trademark law operates in Second
L ife. 4 19
The Knowledge Base provides some further information about
trademark infringement. Under its "Trademark Guidelines" section,
there is a document entitled "Trademarks and Copyright in Second
Life., 4 20 This explains to users that trademark infringement in Second
Life could have serious legal repercussions "in real world courts of
law" and that "nothing about [an infringer's] use of Second Life will
Whether they are described as a body of private law, a virtual world constitution or a mere
private contract, these agreements constitute the link between real world laws and fantasy play.
Janowich, supra note 413, at 5. Virtual world operators use these documents to define the
bounds of user rights, to enumerate both the acceptable uses of their service and the
consequences for unacceptable use and to disclose (or more appropriately disclaim) what, if any,
legal liability the virtual world operator would incur on account of its users' potentially unlawful
or tortious uses.
414. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 118.
415. Second Life, Support, http://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/security.asp (last
visited Feb. 11, 2008).
416. We should note that apart from these documents and scattered news reports, we are
not aware of the details of how Linden approaches trademark law in Second Life.
417. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 118. We note that, if avatar/account names
in Second Life cannot violate trademark rights, there is no reason for this language.
418. Id.
419. Section 3.2 provides, in relevant part:
You further understand and agree that: (i) you are solely responsible for
understanding all copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret and other intellectual
property or other laws that may apply to your Content hereunder; (ii) you are
solely responsible for, and Linden Lab will have no liability in connection with,
the legal consequences of any actions or failures to act on your part while using
the Service, including without limitation any legal consequences relating to your
intellectual property rights.
Id.
420. Second Life, Support, supra note 415.
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shield" him or her from said liability.421 It goes on to state that:
"Linden staff generally removes content that uses trademarks without
apparent authorization, with or without giving notice to the object
owner."422 The "Trademarks and Copyright" document also notes that
residents may file an abuse report to notify Linden Lab of another
user's potentially unauthorized use of a mark.423
From the standpoint of protecting Linden from a potential
lawsuit, the TOS and Knowledge Base, have limitations. While
Linden could potentially gain a contractual indemnification from the
primary infringer, this will not shield it from liability.424 Even if
indemnity were effective, 425 it would not guarantee that Linden could
avoid the threat of injunctive relief or even damages.426
The Linden policy also seems to indicate that an infringement-
based "Abuse Report" can be filed only within the world.427 This
means that a non-user would need to create a Second Life account
(and assent to Linden's contractual requirements) in order to report an
infringement. Even if the report is filed, Linden does not make clear
what it will do in response to a report.
421. Second Life, Knowledge Base, available via guest login, https://secure-
web I0.secondlife.com/community/support.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
422. Second Life: Knowledge Base,, available via guest login, https://secure-
web I 0.secondlife.com/community/support.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) To determine
whether a mark is trademarked, Linden suggests performing a search on the US Patent &
Trademark website and provides the relevant directions to do so. Id.
423. Second Life: Knowledge Base,, available via guest login,, https://secure-
web IO.secondlife.com/community/support.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
424. Following Linden Lab's Terms of Service, the laws of the State of California would
apply when determining whether the relevant TOS sections constitute legitimate indemnity
clauses. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 118, § 7.1. Under California law, the right to
indemnity and the construction of indemnity contracts is controlled, in part, by statute. Cal. Civ.
Code § 2778 (West 2007).
425. For instance, applying California law to Linden's indemnification, in that jurisdiction
an agreement providing for indemnification against one's own negligence is valid only if it is
clear and explicit, and such agreement will be strictly construed against the indemnitee (in this
case, Linden). Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 396 P.2d 377, 379 (Cal. 1964). In fact,
"failure to state an attempted exculpatory or indemnity [clause] in plain, unambiguous and clear
terminology will result in an interpretation that the clause was not intended to exempt the actor
from liability for his own negligence." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 47 Cal.
Rptr. 518, 521 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
426. All successful plaintiffs (in a trademark infringement suit) can seek injunctive relief.
In the case of registered marks, the plaintiff can also seek: the defendant's profits, any damages
sustained by the plaintiff and the costs of the litigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2000). These
damages can be tripled if there is a showing of bad faith. Id. § 1117(b).
427. Second Life, Abuse Reporting,
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptlD=4417&task-knowledge&question
ID=3989 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
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The "reason to know" cases, discussed above, raise some
interesting questions with regard to whether Linden Lab's anti-
infringement policy is enough to insulate it from liability or whether it
simply establishes liability. Applying the applicable standards, a
reasonable virtual world operator, like Linden, should realize that it
had created a service that could be used to engage in trademark
infringement. Linden provides development tools that allow users
substantial freedom in creating "virtual" trademarks; fosters an in-
world business market; and manages the currency exchange that
permits users to translate play money into real cash.
In addition, Linden markets Second Life as an imaginary world
where anything is possible-a virtual invitation for users to engage in
behavior not permitted in their "first life." The user base may well
consist of some individuals, like Neo and Trinity, who are either
engaging in fantasy play and/or trying to make a little extra money by
operating a virtual business. Because most users will probably
consider their activities a form of "play," they may well not suspect
that, for example, the reproduction and sale (for Lindens) of a virtual
Coke could raise any significant legal issues. Linden does not do
much to alter this situation. It simply tells users to educate themselves
about the law.
As discussed above with respect to the Tiffany case, even if
Linden complies to some extent with requests to remove infringing
materials, it is not clear that these measures will be deemed sufficient
to avoid the threat of contributory liability. Linden seems to
acknowledge that trademark infringement occurs in its governing
agreements. This raises the question of whether the "Abuse Report"
and Linden's response are adequate remedial measures.
To answer this question, a court would need evidence regarding
Linden's procedures for responding to reports; any curative steps
(such as removing infringing content); any action against the infringer
(such as account suspension); and statistics on the number of
complaints as compared to Linden's responses. This information is
not, presently, publicly available, and, without it, Linden's knowledge
of infringement cannot accurately be assessed.42 8
As noted at the beginning of this section, meeting the "direct
control and monitoring" and "reason to know" thresholds still would
428. For example, a court might find that Linden was willfully blind if the aforementioned
evidence showed a pattern of numerous complaints without a response. On the other hand, if
Linden swiftly responded to trademark owner complaints (by removing the infringing content
and suspending the infringer's account), this might suffice to avoid liability.
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not necessarily foreclose Linden's ability to escape secondary
liability. If Linden demonstrates that there is no direct infringement, it
cannot be found liable for contributory trademark liability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A beachside cabana in Second Life, framed by palm trees.
Neo and Trinity are sitting on a bench.
Trinity: NEO, WTS Nikes PLZ?
Neo: No, Trin, I do not want to sell you any more
Nikes. I read something in WIPO magazine that
scared me. I deleted my inventory.
Trinity: OMG! LOL!
Neo: Yep. So much for my attempt to critique the
evanescence and immateriality of 21st consumer
culture... and make some Lindens while I was at
it.
In this article, we have made the case that, even though virtual
worlds may seem like mere fantasy games, they may, in some cases,
be environments where the requirements of common law and
statutory trademark infringement can be met. Perhaps this is not
surprising. Trademark lawsuits found their way onto the Internet
many years ago-virtual worlds may simply be the next zones for the
expansion of trademark law online.
The traditional rationale of trademark law-the need to reward
producer investments in popular goods and the need to prevent
consumer deception-would seem to apply in virtual worlds as well
as it does anywhere else. Yet trademark law has, at times, been
deployed by plaintiffs in ways that have posed threats to expressive
freedoms both offline and online. As the Marvel v. NCSofi case
demonstrated, these kinds of abuses of trademark law could
potentially occur with respect to virtual worlds as well.429
This concerns us. It would be very unfortunate if the fear of
direct or secondary liability for trademark infringement led virtual
world creators to limit the creative powers they grant to users. It
would also be unfortunate if participants erred toward "safer"
practices with respect to expressive uses of trademarks. Virtual
429. Marvel Enterprises, Inc. v. NCSoft, Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
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worlds, and especially user-generated virtual worlds, seem to provide
their primary value to their users as zones of free fantasy and free
play.430
If designers and participants self-censor their use of trademarks
for fear of incurring liability, much value might be lost in the
movement (which seems to be already occurring) toward more
sanitized and less free virtual environments. We hope that the first
courts applying trademark law will bear this concern in mind.
While virtual worlds cannot avoid the reach of trademark law by
virtue of being "only computer games," maybe there is something to
this claim. Like computer games, virtual worlds offer value to
participants insofar as they offer liminal and compelling virtual
spaces on the border between reality and fantasy.431
Perhaps the key question we must ask, looking toward the future,
is whether trademark law-and law generally-is prepared to shield
some aspects of these new, economically real, digital fantasies from
potential liability.
430. See Balkin, supra note 27.
431. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 77 (providing an ethnography of player culture in
Everquest).
